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Abstract
Safety Aware Platooning of Automated Electric Transport Vehicles
by
Spencer Scott Jackson, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2013
Major Professor: Dr. Chris Winstead
Department: Electrical and Computer Engineering
Automated Electric Transport (AET) is a promising variation of highway automation,
a topic of interest for decades. Whereas previously researched schemes have been largely
developed around the internal combustion engine vehicle, AET will use purely electric vechi-
cles. In the thesis, several models of electric vehicles are developed and applied to platooning
situations. These models will be created with the goal of evaluating how platooning safety
can be increased, especially with regard to the emergency brake scenario. The results pro-
vide insight to the effects of variance in a homogeneous vehicle system. The models will
also be used by other researchers in the project for system-level analysis.
(139 pages)
iv
Public Abstract
Safety Aware Platooning of Automated Electric Transport Vehicles
by
Spencer Scott Jackson, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2013
Major Professor: Dr. Chris Winstead
Department: Electrical and Computer Engineering
Safety is a paramount concern when considering implementation of an automated high-
way where computers control the vehicles. Even with computer-fast reaction time there is
inevitably some delay and if vehicles do not follow at safe distances, emergency braking
maneuvers can cause dangerous collisions. This research investigates situations that might
make automated vehicles have dangerous collisions and what standards the system design
must hold to keep passengers safe.
vTo my brilliant wife, and our two new sons. . .
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Highway Automation
As highway congestion increases in high-volume commuter areas, delays and accidents
caused by human errors create frustrating costs to the individual, the environment, and
to the local economy. Emissions from vehicles can have negative influence on local air
conditions affecting both physical and mental health of residents and the environment as a
whole. Dependence on foreign oil is detrimental to national economics. Various competing
technologies are developing to reduce vehicle fossil fuel consumption and emissions including
fuel cells, hybrid vehicles, fully electric vehicles (EVs), and others. These address the
problems with internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles’ use of oil and emissions but do
not offer any relief from traffic congestion. Various alternative forms of transportation and
public transit are in development and use to help relieve delays, but these do not offer the
performance and convenience of traditional automobiles. Unfortunately, highways create a
sort of prisoner’s dilemma: if everyone uses public transit, congestion is less and service gets
better, but those who drive private vehicles get the benefit of convenience and often shorter
travel time. If everyone drives private vehicles, congestion occurs and delays increase for
all. In contrast, highway automation offers relief from both congestion and inconvenience
by removing human errors from highway driving. This brings benefits of safety, energy
efficiency, highway capacity, and convenience.
To most vehicle owners, an appealing factor for developing self-driving cars is freeing
commuters from the menial task of driving, allowing drivers to become passengers, free
to read, nap, enjoy media, or whatever they choose. Less obvious reasons include traffic
congestion relief, benefits to the environment, and perhaps most importantly, safety.
21.1.1 Automation Benefits
In stopped traffic, ICEs idle, getting literally zero miles per gallon. Every ounce of
emissions enters the atmosphere, wasted. Hybrid vehicles, such as the Toyota Prius, reduce
this wasteful polluting through using electric motors during “stop-go” situations and rely
on the addition of the combustion motor when higher torque is necessary. Even these high
efficiency vehicles are not zero emissions as are pure EVs. When EVs are powered through
clean energy generating mediums such as solar, wind, or nuclear power, they truly produce
zero emissions. Automation of EVs has additional benefit of reducing the congestion that
leads to inefficient stop-go behavior and could reduce total energy consumption of the
highway system through careful vehicle and traffic control.
Traffic congestion is traditionally remedied through the addition of lanes. This method
is effective but becomes difficult and expensive when urban areas are developed with insuf-
ficient space for expansion. Automation uses the existing space more efficiently, increasing
density so more vehicles can travel on each lane. A major cause of inefficient use of lanes
is delays due to accidents. Even minor incidents during rush hour traffic can cause delays
that last for hours before traffic resumes normal flow. Hitchcock points out that over ninety
percent of accidents on highways are the result of human error [1]. Even a reduction of
incidents by half through automation would have great benefits to highway performance.
Finally, safety is one of the greatest motivating factors. While vehicle manufacturers
continue to improve safety of vehicles such that accidents are not lethal, the sheer number
of vehicles on the road and daily incidents make the automobile one of the leading killers in
the United States [2]. Safety is improving: the number of deaths per vehicle mile traveled
(VMT) has been steadily dropping for the past half-century. It was reported approximately
forty thousand people died annually from vehicle collisions in 2007 [3], and the number
dropped to around thirty-four-thousand in 2009 [4]. Currently, a fatality only occurs ap-
proximately once per two million VMT, and an injury every fifty thousand VMT. Freeways
are actually safer than most other high-traffic roads [5]. By removing the human factor to
driving, automation has great potential to increase safety.
3Safety is the highest priority in highway automation design due to the potential for
fatalities in event of a system failure. It is impossible to estimate the true cost of a loss
of life. If the system is not safer than current roadways it is unlikely to be supported by
users. In an automated highway the primary collision to be concerned with is the rear-
end collision, since lane maneuvers can be very carefully controlled. The safe spacing for
the vehicles in various maneuvers is determined by braking abilities of the vehicles, which
limit the controllers. A vehicle able to brake instantaneously at any deceleration could be
perfectly safe at any following distance. If the vehicle characteristics are set, safety is a
trade-off with capacity, such that if the cars are following closely any delay or error is more
likely to cause collision. Ultimately the “safest” system would have the vehicles following
extremely far apart, which would reduce the capacity to unacceptable levels. The main
objective is to improve both capacity and safety. Difficulty lies in control of the vehicle.
Considering highway drivers currently do not follow at safe distances, safety alone is easy
to improve upon, but at high capacity it is a challenging problem.
1.1.2 Connectivity and Automation
Part of the solution to the difficulty is through communication between vehicles. In
traditional car following models the amount of time for perception and reaction are generally
defined by some stochastic distribution. This has some application to automated vehicles,
but the distributions have much less variance as computers and sensors are relatively fast
and do not get distracted. If vehicles are connected through wireless communication, they
can act cooperatively, such that the perception time is simply the time required for a vehicle
to send a brake signal over the wireless network. By communicating a maneuver in advance
cars can act synchronously such that both perception and reaction time for following vehicles
are effectively zero. This allows vehicles to follow very closely, for large capacity gains.
Automation does not necessarily have high connectivity. The Google Car was able to
travel thousands of miles with little or no human intervention based entirely on sensing and
control. This sort of “free-agent” system design is robust since each vehicle is able to act
independently; error does not propagate to other vehicles. Some current luxury vehicles
4feature sensing-based intelligent cruise control, which is a stride toward automation. While
it is clearly not a requirement for automation, inter-vehicle communication can have large
benefits to capacity and safety. It does however impose certain issues. Security of the
network must be maintained and consistently high data rates must be maintained if very
high performance requires good communication. While these issues are important, they are
only touched on by this research.
1.2 Platooning
One way to organize automated vehicles on the highway is in platoons — linear groups
of consecutive vehicles acting in unison and traveling in close-following formation. This
strategy puts vehicles within a platoon following very closely. This small intra-platoon
separation allows for drafting which increases efficiency by reducing aerodynamic drag on
following vehicles in the platoon. Platoons follow each other at a larger inter-platoon dis-
tance. This is illustrated in Figure 1.1. In this way platoons act like trains, but each car in
the platoon is able to have a unique destination. Kanaris et al. [6] finds that while maintain-
ing the same safety level, platooning has significantly higher capacities than highways using
free agent systems whether free-agent vehicles had intercommunication or not. Platoon-
ing requires high connectivity and automation to be safe because intra-platoon following
distances are so short.
Platooning was researched in depth by the National Automated Highway System Con-
sortium (NAHSC) led by the Partners for Advanced Transit and Highways (PATH) group
at University of California, Berkeley. Their thorough work of over 1000 publications and
reports through the 1990s and early 2000s was toward retrofitting existing vehicles and de-
veloping strategies to implement automated highway platooning. PATH was able to achieve
a real life platooning demo in 1997 [7–9] but they had some limitations due to the use of ICE
L FF
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Fig. 1.1: Two platoons. L indicates the lead vehicle of the platoon, F a follower.
5vehicless. The largest difficulty of the ICE vehicle is the rate limits and other nonlinearities
in the engine and brakes. One such rate limit arises because of the inability of internal
combustion engines (ICEs) to provide instantaneous torque. Generally the engine must rev
to a higher speed when torque is needed, making a slower response to a step input. Simi-
larly the hydraulic brakes introduce a pure time delay that make string stability degrade as
platoon size grows. String stability requires that spacing errors decrease as they propagate
down the platoon.
Many current groups are also researching platooning such as Safe Road Trains for
the Environment (SARTRE), which forms platoons of intercommunicating vehicles using a
manually driven cargo truck with a certified driver as the lead vehicle [10]. A similar work
is Rheinisch-Westflische Technische University Aachen’s project KONVOI, which focuses
mainly on whole platoons of cargo trucks [11]. The Korea Advanced Institute of Science and
Technology (KAIST) On-Line Electric Vehicles (OLEV) project is also currently researching
related topics [12], though that group is focused primarily on electrification. In each of these
projects, the vehicles are at least partly controlled by a computer rather than a driver.
Excepting of OLEV these groups are using ICE vehicles.
Some promising improvements can be made by using EVs for platooning. Electrical
motors have primary time constants of an order of magnitude smaller than a typical com-
bustion engine. Brake by wire technology can offer higher performance to hydraulic brake
systems or electromechanical brakes (EMBs) and regenerative braking can yield other per-
formance improvements still [13]. Other technologies developed since PATH’s work in the
computing, sensing, and communication fields have direct benefits for automated platoon-
ing. It is expected that the progress in technology will make highway automation even more
viable and achievable.
1.3 Automated Electric Transport
The automated highway scheme currently under investigation at Utah State University
(USU) is known as automated electric transport (AET). In this variation of automation,
vehicles are charged wirelessly through electromagnetic induction from coils in the road.
6This power strategy, under research at the USU Energy Dynamics Laboratory, reduces the
need for large, bulky batteries required in long range electric vehicles. AET vehicles have a
large enough battery system for the user to get from origin to the highway (within twenty
miles for most of the American population). Once on the AET highway the vehicle will
be completely powered and even recharged through wireless power transfer while traveling.
This allows lighter, more efficient vehicles and greater flexibility in vehicle form.
When contemplating the AET concept it quickly becomes clear that there are a great
many details in implementing such a complex system. Many important design decisions are
yet to be decided. The role of this work is to create models to demonstrate the effects of
various design decisions on safety. These models can be incorporated into the work of other
researchers or used independently to help designers understand and fulfill the requirements
for a safe system.
1.4 Thesis Overview
First a series of simple kinematic models are developed and used to show the critical
factors for vehicle and communication system selection. Next, the models are used for
Monte Carlo analysis to determine the probability of unsafe impact with respect to following
distance. Physical modeling is then used to determine what parameters of vehicle design
and condition most contribute to variation in braking. The model is then extended to a
full platoon of vehicles. Finally, the full platoon model is used to test several different
controllers in emergency situations to determine which is safest.
7Chapter 2
The Emergency Brake Scenario
A primary concern with platooning is how vehicles are kept from running into one
another. This natural concern keeps drivers following at the distances seen in current
highway systems. Brake lights warn surrounding drivers to slow down, reducing the time
required to perceive the need to brake. There is still a delay inherent to drivers, who must
see the signal and react to it. The car itself also has a delay, as it takes some time to reduce
speed. In addition, different vehicles have different braking abilities, imposing additional
requirements for spacing. Insufficient following distances to account for these delays result
in rear-end collisions.
A computer has much quicker reaction time than humans, so an automated vehicle is
able to follow at much smaller distances, but the principles are largely the same. The most
extreme instance of this (requiring the longest separation) is the complete stop of a platoon
with the leader braking at maximum ability — the emergency brake scenario. It becomes
the main consideration in controller design for each maneuver and in overall system design.
The ideal distance between vehicles is dictated by the reaction time and braking ability.
Reaction time includes sensing and communication time, computation time, and actuation
delay. Braking ability can be compromised by tire wear, road conditions, brake actuator
time constants, vehicle normal force (load), drag forces, and other influences.
There are many ways that the emergency brake scenario can be initiated. One way
is the “brake-on” failure, where the leader’s brakes unexpectedly lock or a computer error
sends a maximum brake signal. The vehicle systems should be designed to be robust against
these failures. A more familiar cause would be an obstacle on the road when swerving is
not possible. Again, the system could be designed to reduce the number of these instances
through using barriers and banning open cargo loads which could result in extraneousness
8objects on the road.
The probability of these events, even in current highway systems, seems low but does
exist, so such possibilities must be considered in system design. A thorough analysis of the
likelihood of these faults is beyond the scope of this work, but must be conducted in order
to perform an accurate cost analysis of the system.
2.1 Difference in Velocity and Initial Headway
Two important factors in this investigation are the initial headway (H) between vehicles
when an emergency is initiated and the difference in velocity (∆v) between the vehicles when
a collision occurs, sometimes called closing speed in the literature. Any emergency brake
scenario begins when vehicles are separated at some distance. This initial headway reflects
the steady state following distance and is inversely related to the system capacity. In any
collision, the vehicles have some difference in their traveling velocity at the instant the
impact occurs. This ∆v is proportional to the severity of the impact and therefore a metric
of safety. ∆v is also a function of H.
2.1.1 Difference in Velocity
It will be shown below in Section 2.8.2 that safe platooning is very difficult to achieve
(if not impossible) if no collisions can be tolerated in emergency situations. It may seem
counter-intuitive to plan collisions into the system design, but it can yield large benefits in
system performance without creating additional danger to passengers. This is because the
danger of a collision is proportional to ∆v of the colliding vehicles, rather than the absolute
velocity.
Consider a vehicle colliding into a parked vehicle at 2m/s (< 4.5mph). There might
be some concern about damage to the bumpers and paint but the damage will be minimal
and almost no fear of injury would exist. On the opposite end of the spectrum, a head on
collision of two vehicles traveling at 20m/s would be very concerning. Probability of injury
or death is very high. This is a high ∆v situation because the relative velocity is double
each vehicle’s speed. Next consider a rear end collision between two vehicles traveling at
930m/s and 32m/s. Even though these are relatively high speeds, the ∆v is the same as the
parked car incident, so only the bumpers are likely to suffer if only a single impact occurs.
Therefore a large ∆v in colliding vehicles generates a large impact force and severe injuries
and vehicle damage can result. Small ∆v can have little consequence even if the absolute
velocity of the vehicles is great.
Hereon it is assumed that there exists some ∆vsafe such that any collision occurring
with ∆v < ∆vsafe is acceptable due to very low risk of injury. This is an assumption made
in other works [1, 14, 15] and suggested by medical studies (i.e. [16, 17]). Hitchcock [14]
used real incident record data from California to analyze the relationship of injury severity
with ∆v and a threshold ∆v was observed where no data existed below. The threshold was
determined by Hitchcock to be 3.3m/s. In the work that follows a more conservative 2.5m/s
is used. An additional argument that collisions under ∆vsafe are acceptable is that these
collisions only occur under rare emergency situations. In normal operation, no collisions
occur. If failures occur but ∆v is low, collisions are unlikely to be dangerous.
2.1.2 Headway
In highway emergency brake scenarios, for any two particular vehicles in succession,
∆v of an impact is a function of headway. Consider two vehicles following at a matched
speed with delay in braking. If the vehicles are following at an initial headway (H) of 0m,
they are touching bumpers and have effectively already collided. If an emergency brake
scenario occurs, ∆v is zero meters per second. At this extreme the forces generated are
not likely to be great between the two vehicles, despite the delay or difference in braking
ability. If instead the vehicles initially follow at H of one meter, the delay is enough that the
follower will not even begin braking before the collision occurs, and ∆v will become more
significant. Thus, against intuition, it is actually safer to follow with very little headway
than at a somewhat small headway where the preceding vehicle could decelerate more before
impact occurs. At the opposite end, if H is sufficiently large both vehicles can come to a
complete stop without any collision despite delays.
A curve can be generated to show what the ∆v at impact would be with respect to the
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initial headway. Called an H-∆v curve hereafter, this curve describes the danger of following
at certain headways. The curve changes according to the vehicles’ braking differences and
delays, but in general it follows an arch shape, dictating that the safest headways are very
close or very far. Figure 2.1 shows an example H-∆v curve.
Any two vehicles in succession have a unique H-∆v curve based on the system and
vehicles’ performance characteristics. Therefore modeling the platoon emergency braking
scenario can be simplified to only a leader and single follower. In this context, the “lead”
vehicle is not necessarily the leader of the platoon. These could represent any vehicle in the
system and its immediate follower, including the last vehicle in a platoon and the leader of
the following platoon (who becomes, in this context, the follower). If there are two platoons
of 10 vehicles involved in the emergency brake scenario 19 such interactions occur. With
this in mind it is apparent that in an automated highway with potentially thousands of
vehicles, very low probabilities of dangerous impacts must be achieved.
2.2 Shaping the H-∆v Curve
There are three main sections that compose the H-∆v curve of an emergency brake
scenario. The first is when the lead vehicle begins decelerating and the follower is still
traveling at the same velocity. This rapid rise in ∆v is the result of pure time delay in
the reaction of the following vehicle. The second section is where both vehicles are braking
at their maximum capability amin (note that the deceleration is notated as a negative
acceleration). If the leader has lower amin (better brakes) then the second segment will
slope upwards, ∆v continuing to increase if the follower is at increased initial headway
and therefore closer is safer. In the opposite situation the segment slopes downward since
the follower has the lower amin and the more headway provided the more the follower will
reduce velocity (and therefore ∆v), so further is safer. The third and final section is caused
by the leader reaching a complete stop while the follower continues decelerating. Here ∆v
quickly decreases with additional headway. In the event that the follower has lower amin
and reaches a complete stop first then the second section reaches the x-axis and in the third
section ∆v will be negative which is considered inconsequential since no impact can occur.
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Fig. 2.1: H-∆v curve.
Therefore the H-∆v curve is only shown and considered in the first quadrant.
2.2.1 Simple Equations
Simple equations can be developed for the H-∆v curve to aid in understanding the
three segments. These equations are similar to the model developed in Section 2.3 and later
used for the analysis but are very simple. Assume the vehicles are able to achieve infinite
jerk so
a = a∗
where a∗ is the desired acceleration. The first section is created by the leader braking at
maximum capability and the leader still traveling at initial velocity.
al = aminl,
af = 0,
where aminl is negative to reflect deceleration. In the balance of this text, the subscripts l
and f indicate leader and follower, respectively. This makes the velocities and positions:
vl = v0 + aminlt,
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vf = v0,
xl = x0l + v0t+
1
2
aminlt
2,
xf = x0f + v0t.
The headway (H) and ∆v then are then
∆v = vf − vl = −aminlt,
H = xf − xl = x0f − x0l − 1
2
aminlt
2.
The vehicles are treated as points and the initial positions taken to be equal such that
x0l = x0f and
H = −1
2
aminlt
2.
This then is the parametrically defined H-∆v curve. With equations this simple, the
parameter t can be removed to find ∆v as a function of H:
∆v1(H) = −aminl
√
− 2H
aminl
=
√
−2Haminl.
Continuing the same development for the next two segments of the curve.
al = aminl
af = aminf
vl = v0 + aminlt
vf = v0 + aminf (t− tdel)
xl = x0 + v0t+
1
2
aminlt
2
xf = x0 + v0t+
1
2
aminf t
2 − aminf tdelt+ 1
2
aminf t
2
del
∆v = aminf (t− tdel)− aminlt
H =
1
2
aminf t
2 − aminf tdelt+ 1
2
aminf t
2
del −
1
2
aminlt
2
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∆v2(H) =
√
(aminf − aminl) (2H − aminf tdel) + a2minf t2del
al = 0
af = aminf
vl = 0
vf = v0 + aminf (t− tdel)
xl = x0 − v
2
0
2aminl
xf = x0 + v0t+
1
2
aminf t
2 − aminf tdelt+ 1
2
aminf t
2
del
∆v = v0 + aminf (t− tdel)
H = v0t+
1
2
aminf t
2 − aminf tdelt+ 1
2
aminf t
2
del +
v20
2aminl
∆v3(H) =
√
2aminfH − aminf
aminl
v20 − 2aminfv0tdel + v20
The intersection points occur when the follower begins braking after the delay, t = tdel,
and when the leader has reached a complete stop, t = tstopl =
v0
aminl
which correspond to
H1 = −12aminlt2del and H2 =
aminf
2aminl
v20 +
aminf
aminl
v0tdel +
1
2aminf t
2
del − v
2
0
2aminl
, respectively. Both
vehicles are stopped at H3 = − v
2
0
2aminf
+ v0tdel +
v20
2aminl
. The resulting piecewise function is
∆v(H) =

√−2Haminl, H = (0, H1]√
(aminf − aminl) (2H − aminf tdel) + a2minf t2del, H = (H1, H2]√
2aminfH − aminfaminl v20 − 2aminfv0tdel + v20, H = (H2, H3]
0, Otherwise.
(2.1)
Let it again be noted that amin is negative to represent deceleration, so ∆v ∈ R for the
domain of H ∈ [0,∞).
These equations are an abstraction of the cyber-physical systems that would compose
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an AET vehicle. Abstraction is used in order to maintain independence from specific tech-
nologies that are likely to change and develop with time. This achieves a model that is
useful to represent any system that might be developed, using current or future technology.
This technique of model abstraction is used for all the models presented in this chapter.
2.2.2 Implications of Equation 2.1
One will notice in (2.1) that the first segment is only influenced by the leader braking
ability. This factor could be controlled though derating leader braking which is a very
important concept since it could have large benefits to platooning safety by significantly
lowering the H-∆v curve. However, this and related schema assume that the leader has full
control of braking ability. In the event that an obstacle is collided with or there is a tire
or brake hardware failure, braking control would definitely be compromised and the vehicle
would not be able to maintain the derated acceleration. More research is required for this
strategy but is not within the scope of this work. Even derating only lessens the slope of the
first section by increasing aminl. This steeply rising section is unavoidable unless braking
is perfectly coordinated. This leads to the concept of brake synchronization where a leader
would send a brake signal to the followers indicating an advanced time for all to brake. This
has safety implications of requiring greater headway for the platoon to stop due to the time
required for a communication to travel to the end of the platoon.
The amount of time taken for the follower’s brakes to begin acting dictates the length
of the first segment. So while the sharp rise is somewhat unavoidable the overall effect
can be reduced through minimizing the amount of delay between vehicles. Again this is
an argument in the favor of coordinated braking. The primary time constant of the brake
actuator (not reflected in these equations) affects the transition between the first two periods
and will be discussed in Section 2.3.
The second segment of the curve occurs while both vehicles are braking. Thus, it is
a function of both vehicles’ amin. The difference dictates the slope of the equation, thus
if vehicles are matched the second segment remains level. This again leads to the idea of
derating such that aminl > aminf and segment two has negative slope. This, combined with
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a very small tdel, could create a very small H-∆v curve and a very safe system. Derating
has the negative effect that the leader would take more time to stop making the second
segment longer, but if the slope is negative or small the benefits could outweigh this cost.
Figure 2.2 shows three curves with varying relationships between aminf and aminl.
The third segment begins when the leader has reached a complete stop. The rapidity
of the fall of ∆v is a function of aminf . In this segment the initial velocity plays a role, as
it dictates how long is required for the leader to stop.
These equations are interesting for generating ideas to improve the emergency brake
scenario, but for detailed analysis, it is useful to include more factors.
2.3 The First Order Model
A few more terms are useful to look at but quickly add to the complexity of the model.
The braking of each vehicle is modeled simply as a deceleration curve of a first order system
with delay. This approximates the traditional hydraulic actuated calipers on disc or drum
brakes used on today’s vehicles. These have some delay for the hydraulic pump to build
pressure and for the calipers to close on the disc, then the building of caliper pressure
on the disc increases the braking force (and thus deceleration) in approximately a first
order response [18]. In the model the actuator delay (d) and time constant (τ) is separately
assignable for both leader and follower (indicated by subscript l and f , respectively). Factors
such as aerodynamic and tire drag are lumped into the minimum acceleration term, amin.
The leader begins braking at t = 0 seconds and immediately sends a “brake” signal
to the follower. The signal is delayed by some communication delay, T , which lumps com-
putation time and other pure time delays. The follower receives and immediately begins
braking. The remaining model input parameters are the initial velocities of each vehicle.
These are all reflected in the block diagram in Figure 2.3. Thus the lumped tdel from Section
2.2.1 is being split to differentiate a communication delay T and an actuation delay d.
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Fig. 2.2: H-∆v curves for different aminf .
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T
∆v (t)
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Fig. 2.3: Block diagram of simple model.
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The model is therefore defining the jerk or third derivative of position for each vehicle.
a˙l =

0, t < dl
aminl−al
τl
, dl ≤ t < tstopl
0, t ≥ tstopl
a˙f =

0, t < T + df
aminf−af
τf
, T + df ≤ t < tstopf
0, t ≥ tstopf
This is then integrated four times to find the vehicles’ positions at time t. The increase
of order in the differential equations makes the analysis done in Section 2.2.1 much more
rigorous for these equations. While the closed form solution like (2.1) is still solvable, the
result is much more complex and would not provide additional insights to those already
gathered from (2.1). Thus the closed form solution is not pursued here.
2.4 Matlab/Simulink Model
For further analysis, a method to rapidly generate H-∆v curves is warranted. Since
the equations are somewhat difficult or awkward, a Simulink model was developed. The
model follows the form of the block diagram in Figure 2.3. The model represents the state
equations
X˙ =

...
x
x¨
x˙
 =

a˙
v˙
x˙
 =

amin−a
τ
a
v

for each vehicle, with the discontinuities in a˙ corresponding to delays and when the vehicle
reaches a complete stop. The output
Y =
∆v
H
 =
0 1 0
0 0 1
 (Xf − Xl)
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is the parametrically defined H-∆v curve. It is saved to the Matlab workspace for further
computation, visualization, or analysis.
One of the primary purposes of this work is to provide tools for other investigators
in the project. This model can be used to evaluate different system strategies such as
coordinated braking and brake derating. The inputs are all configurable through Matlab
scripting, so large numbers of curves can be generated very quickly without starting the
Simulink environment. For screenshots of the model and script examples the reader is
referred to Appendix A. The model is abstract enough to cover a broad spectrum of vehicle
and system design considerations, yet detailed enough to provide insight to the effects of
complex behaviors such as clock jitter. When probabilistic distributions are used for input
parameters, the model can become quite a powerful tool.
Some examples of factors and designs the model is being used to analyze in this and
other research.
sensitivity to delay communication delay T is varied across a range
disparity in braking ability minimum acceleration of the follower aminf is set below the
leader
derating minimum acceleration of the leader aminl is set to lower values
coordination communication delay T is set to zero
clock jitter actuation delays are adjusted a few milliseconds to make vehicles brake slightly
out of sync
For this document, parameter sensitivity is focused on since it is considered to be
more fundamental than these other considerations. To aid in any of these analyses it is
important to identify appropriate ways to interpret the H-∆v curve data that is output
from the model.
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2.5 Safety Metrics
While an understanding of the H-∆v curve is useful, the curve itself is not a clear
metric for system performance or safety. Several other metrics could be gathered from the
H-∆v curve to determine whether the system design is “better” or not. These include the
peak ∆v value, the domain of unsafe headways (width of the curve), or some combination
such as the area under the curve. Different metrics are useful for different analyses.
The peak ∆v metric is useful to describe the most severe possible incident between
two vehicles. This indicates the relative “safeness” but does not indicate what headways
are unsafe, thus this metric is not related to system capacity. This metric is used for a
sensitivity analysis of safety with respect to input parameters.
The domain of unsafe headways is a useful metric since it immediately shows all unsafe
separations. The unsafe region lies between the safe separation regions for following within
and between platoons. Though it adds complexity by using two numbers to describe the
upper and lower bounds of the unsafe region, the information about the system that one can
quickly gather allows for easy interpretation. Visualization is also relatively simple. This
metric has units of meters but still has some information about safety due to its definition.
Any collision over the threshold ∆vsafe is unacceptable and so vehicles should avoid this
“unsafe headway zone” (UHZ) at all times.
The area under the H-∆v curve could effectively indicate the relative safeness of a
system or situation while also containing information about the system performance. How-
ever, this metric has units of meters-squared-per-second which seem arbitrary and unclear
where an unacceptable level would lie. It is also possible for two curves to have the same
area with one being very wide and short, the other being very narrow and tall. In this case
the narrow curve is preferable since it would be safer to make cars avoid a small section of
dangerous headways than to have risk in a large region of headways. This is not reflected
in the “area” metric.
For these reasons the domain of unsafe headways is the primary metric considered here.
Though it does focus mostly on capacity it does so in a conservative way that will maintain
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a high safety level as long as vehicles avoid the UHZ.
2.6 The Unsafe Headway Zone
The UHZ is the region where the subsequent vehicle would have an unsafe collision if
an emergency brake scenario were to occur. The H-∆v curve virtually extends from the
rear bumper of each vehicle and any point of the curve over ∆vsafe corresponds to the UHZ.
Figure 2.4 illustrates this. These drawings are strictly conceptual and not to scale. In this
example the follower vehicle has clearly entered the UHZ. The detailed shape of the curve
will change based on those input parameters, shown in Figure 2.3, but there is little the
follower can do to change those values since they correspond mainly to the condition and
ability of the vehicle hardware and the system. The UHZ is always those headways between
crossings of ∆vsafe (the dashed line). The best behavior for a vehicle when in the UHZ is
not discussed here, though it seems most intuitive in this case for the follower to change
lanes or brake until it is at a safe headway then resume operation as the leader of a new
platoon.
In a platoon, each vehicle has a UHZ behind it, and each vehicle is only subject to
the UHZ of the vehicle immediately preceding it. The UHZ dictates the practical lane
capacity since vehicles merging into or splitting from a platoon can neither enter the UHZ
nor leave gaps between other vehicles which would put one or more at unsafe headways.
This is especially important with the intra-platoon separation distance (left side of the H-
∆v curve). If the UHZ is closer than one vehicle length (usually the case), a single vehicle
splitting from the interior of the platoon then leaves an unsafe gap between the vehicles
immediately preceding and following it. It is possible for multiple vehicles to exit in a group
such that the vehicles behind them are now following at the inter-platoon distance which
effectively makes a new platoon.
Figure 2.5 shows a three vehicle platoon with theH-∆v curves and UHZs of the vehicles.
It is a safe following situation because each vehicle is at a safe headway (not in the UHZ)
from the preceding vehicle. Note that the second H-∆v curve (dotted line) and the resulting
UHZ actually extends past the figure edge. Here it is shown truncated to the end of the
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Fig. 2.4: An unsafe following situation.
previous UHZ.
If the intermediary vehicle were to split from the three car platoon suddenly the second
follower would be subject to the curve associated with the leader and would lie in the UHZ
as illustrated in Figure 2.6. Thus with a UHZ this size, a special design would be required for
an interior vehicle to split from the platoon. One method would be a second lane where the
two followers could both split then accelerate until the second follower is at a safe following
distance from the lead vehicle. The second follower then would join back into the original
platoon and the splitting vehicle is free to exit the system. This requires an extra lane
for the distance required to complete the maneuver. This method would get complicated
in larger platoons with random vehicles desiring to split from the platoon. Thus, effective
capacity could be significantly compromised if the UHZ is too close to the each vehicle to
allow splitting from the interior.
An easier situation is the platoon merge. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show parts of two platoons,
the last following car of one and the leader of the subsequent platoon. In Figure 2.7, the
second platoon is following at a safe distance. In Figure 2.8, a new vehicle has merged
into the first platoon, placing the next platoon into an UHZ. One way to avoid this is to
only allow new platoons to be created when space is sufficient for a full platoon even if the
platoon is not yet filled. This policy prevents platoons from being separated by only the
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Fig. 2.6: An unsafe following situation resulting from a splitting vehicle.
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upper bound of the UHZ until the preceding platoon is full. A vehicle may be required
to wait for an available opening but this is the case in highway driving today. This also
assumes that there is a set limit to the size of a platoon.
2.7 Sensitivity Analysis
Now that the general shape of the H-∆v curve has been developed and discussed,
and appropriate metrics have been selected, it is important to look at the effects of each
parameter on the UHZ. Using the Matlab model each parameter is varied to show that
safety is most sensitive to the vehicles braking abilities.
2.7.1 Nominal Values
Nominal values are those that are considered normal during steady state operation.
These values are based on the assumption that the system will be designed for homogeneous
vehicles using high performance technology. The values are all shown in Table 2.1 with the
ranges they are swept for sensitivity analysis. Only the follower values are swept because any
degradation in leader performance actually improves safety of the followers in an emergency
brake scenario.
For the minimum acceleration, −10m/s is used as a nominal, since this range of decel-
erations is reachable by todays sedans equipped with ABS technology. The nominal time
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Fig. 2.7: Two platoons at a safe distance.
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Fig. 2.8: An unsafe following situation resulting from a merging vehicle.
constant is selected due to [19,20]. They find the brake systems they retrofit for automation
have time constants of 10 − 100ms with pure time delays in a similar range. Gerdes and
Hedrick suggests that a redesign of the hydraulic brakes could get actuation delay values
down to 20ms [21]. Electro-mechanical brakes (EMBs) (which use dc motors rather than
hydraulics) show potential for even higher performance brake systems [13]. In fact, Jo-
hansen et al. [22] modeled an EMB on a Mercedes vehicle as a first order system with pure
delay of 14ms and bandwidth of 72rad/s which corresponds to a time constant of about 2ms.
It was decided to use 10ms for the time constant nominal and 5ms for the nominal actuator
delay. This value of actuation delay may be optimistic since computation time is included
in this time. The initial velocity is simply selected at a value near current US highway
speed limits.
In selecting a nominal value for the communication delay the work of PATH was con-
sidered. In Li [23] the communication architecture design is described for communication
of velocity, acceleration and a time stamp for four platooned vehicles. Each cycle of the
token-bus architecture takes 55ms. Later, in Hedrick et al. [24] PATH discusses a similar
token-bus architecture with a 20ms cycle for up to ten vehicles in a platoon. Wireless com-
munication technology continues to improve. The value used as a nominal here is 20ms.
This is also possibly optimistic considering security is not mentioned in the work by PATH.
Even with advances in technology, such small delays may not be realistically achievable
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in a secure system. The analysis that follows however shows that the system is robust to
variation in these delays.
2.7.2 UHZ Sensitivity Plots
The parameters were swept according to the ranges in Table 2.1 and the resulting UHZs
are plotted in Figure 2.9. Since the x-axis represents different units for each parameter and
the associated curve they are plotted again with respect to parameter variation percentage
in Figure 2.10. Because for minimum acceleration a large percent change means greater
braking capability the UHZ curve looks reversed compared to the other parameters.
It can be observed that the only factors which create unsafe zones are minimum accel-
eration and initial velocity. The other parameters were all varied to an order of magnitude
of degraded performance showing that they must be compromised significantly to become
significant factors and threaten safety. In fact with these nominals no UHZ existed until
τl = 250(ms), dl = 240(ms), or T = 260(ms). From this it can be inferred that T, τ, and d
are related since they each contribute to the total delay from leader braking to the follower
braking. If this total delay exceeds ≈ 275ms there exists an UHZ. These facts, however,
while true for single parameter variation or single faults do not necessarily hold for double
faults. It is clear, however, that the total delay is more significant than any individual delay.
The natures of the minimum acceleration curve and the initial velocity curve are quite
different. The minimum acceleration curve is what would typically be expected since it
Table 2.1: Nominal values and variation for sensitivity analysis.
Parameter Units Nominal Sweep Range Sweep Range (%)
aminf m/s2 −10 −10 100
τl ms 10 10 100
dl ms 5 5 100
v0l m/s 30 30 100
aminf m/s2 −10 (−15,−5) (150, 50)
τl ms 10 (1, 100) (10, 1000)
dl ms 5 (0, 100) (0, 2000)
v0f m/s 30 (25, 35) (83, 117)
T ms 20 (2, 200) (10, 1000)
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Fig. 2.10: Unsafe headway zones for varying parameters scale of nominal values.
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effectively raises the H-∆v curve as amin degrades and the UHZ grows wider. The initial
velocity curve however has no UHZ until the difference in initial velocities is greater than
the threshold ∆vsafe such that v0f = v0l+∆vsafe. At this point the UHZ suddenly includes
all headways from zero to the distance required for the follower to decelerate enough that
∆v is once again below ∆vsafe (just under 10 meters here). Any increase in v0f beyond
this point increases the UHZ linearly. While the v0f curve seems to have greater slope
and thus higher sensitivity to variation beyond that point mentioned, it is of less concern
because it is the one parameter that is easily controlled by the vehicle. The controller can
be designed to avoid operation at velocities over vl + ∆vsafe and this problem is avoided.
Degradation of aminf cannot be compensated for easily by a controller since it would most
likely result from a saturation nonlinearity in the vehicle physics. Therefore, disparity in
the vehicles braking abilities is considered the most significant factor regarding safety in
emergency braking scenarios.
As mentioned above, if a double fault occurs smaller variations can suddenly create
dangerous situations. The system is reasonably robust against double faults in parameters
such as time constant (τ) and communication delay (T ) since these each require large
degradations to become significant, but if a fault occurs degrading aminf and a second fault
causes delay the results become more significant. Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show the UHZ
with respect to parameter variation similar to Figure 2.10, but with degraded nominals
aminf = −9.5 and −8m/s, respectively.
In Figure 2.11, the UHZ curves for aminf and v0f appear nearly vertical while those of
τf and df barely appear at all at the end of the ranges varied here. T shows a much larger
UHZ than τf and df because of its larger nominal value and thus much more significant
contribution to the total delay. As the nominal value of aminf is degraded to −8m/s2 in
Figure 2.12, the UHZ now exists even at the nominal values. This plot shows the closer
relation between the delay terms T, τf , and df though again T appears more sensitive due
to the larger nominal. It deserves notice that all the UHZs match at parameter variation of
one which point corresponds to all parameters at nominal. Ultimately, these graphs show
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Fig. 2.11: Unsafe headway zones for varying parameters with aminf = −9.5m/s2.
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Fig. 2.12: Unsafe headway zones for varying parameters with aminf = −8m/s2.
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that small changes in minimum acceleration create large variations in the UHZ.
2.8 Monte Carlo Analysis
Since safety is most sensitive to variation in the vehicles’ braking abilities, one way to
quantify and analyze the emergency brake scenario is through Monte Carlo methods. It is
assumed that the road conditions effect all vehicles approximately the same amount so the
large variations come from vehicle capability dictated by condition of brake hardware and
tire tread. Two main parameters are considered and analyzed: delay and braking ability.
For simplicity, only one of the delay terms are varied in the Monte Carlo analysis, that
of communication delay (T ). Having less effect on safety than amin, T is only set to one of
two deterministic levels: short, where leader and follower parameters are at nominal levels,
and long, where the follower delay parameters are below the usual performance levels. The
long case could correspond to a fault, or as AET research proceeds, it may be found that
total delay is longer than the nominal value assumed here, and the long delay is more
representative of the actual system.
The parameters safety is most sensitive to, aminl and aminf , are set according to stochas-
tic distributions. The safest system will have homogeneous vehicle performance since vari-
ations cause the braking disparities which worsen the UHZ. However, even with nominally
homogeneous vehicles there is variation in manufacturing and wear, as well as load and
other operating conditions. Two distributions are used, the first being a “strict” distribu-
tion with all vehicles kept within a small braking variance, the other a “loose” distribution
where the standard deviation is larger. This can be thought of as one system where laws
and regulations are very strict, requiring regular checkups to make sure all vehicles have
very consistent braking. The loose distribution system would then be one with fewer checks;
perhaps no certification or registration is required etc., the result being that some vehicles
on the road fall into disrepair, compromising braking, and the variance of braking is greater.
Both distributions are bounded normal distributions. The upper bound represents an
evaluation of braking abilities when vehicles check into the automated highway (i.e. [25,26])
and are subsequently rejected if they do not have sufficiently low minimum acceleration.
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This upper bound changes between distributions. The lower bound for both distributions is
−10m/s2, since this represents the limit of the vehicle type’s ability. Both distributions have
a mean value which is centered between the upper and lower bounds. This assumes as the
regulations on vehicle maintenance are relaxed, the quality of the average vehicle declines.
For illustration, example histograms of the two distributions are shown in Figure 2.13.
This gives four main cases of interest: strict-short, strict-long, loose-short, and loose-
long. The values used for each case are summarized in Table 2.2.
The model is run 1,000 times, each run using a random outcome from one of the
aforementioned distributions for minimum acceleration. Each run produces an H-∆v curve.
The resulting ∆v values are run through a “success” function which returns a one if over
∆vsafe, a threshold corresponding to an acceptable impact velocity where there is effectively
no risk of injury or death, a zero otherwise. The output of the success function process is
a unit rect function of H that is the UHZ. The success function outputs are summed
and normalized such that each headway acts as a bin containing the probability of an
unsafe collision at that following distance. The simulation process is repeated 30 times for
each combination of delay time and distribution and the resulting 30 probability values
for each bin averaged for accuracy. The result for each case illustrates a probability curve
approximating the probability of a collision over ∆vsafe occurring with respect to headway.
These curves can be interpreted to give the safe following distances correlated to vehicle
parameter variations.
2.8.1 Monte Carlo Simulation Results
The plots in Figures 2.14 and 2.15 are the superimposed distributions from the simu-
lation. To better illustrate the change in probability as parameters vary, rather than just
calculating each of the four cases, two cases are presented on each plot, with intermediary
plots showing a parameter sweep between them. For example in the loose distribution plots
in Figure 2.14, between the loose-short and loose-long case curves are eight other loose case
curves where the delay time is swept in 20ms steps from the short case to the long case.
It can be seen that the strict-short configuration is the safest since it has the lowest
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Table 2.2: Case values for Monte Carlo simulations.
Parameter Units Strict-Short Strict-Long Loose-Short Loose-Long
T ms 20 200 20 200
µ m/s2 9.75 9.75 7.75 7.75
σ m/s2 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75
Lower Bound m/s2 −10 −10 −10 −10
Upper Bound m/s2 −9.5 −9.5 −5.5 −5.5
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Fig. 2.14: Unsafe collision probability curves for strict and loose distribution, delay sweeping
20ms intervals.
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Fig. 2.15: Unsafe collision probability curves for short and long delay, distribution mean
sweeping 0.2m/s2 intervals.
probability of collision for all headways. UHZ does not exist even, until the delay increases
to more than 120ms. This is as expected since the vehicles are very closely matched. With
this level of variation in amin, the probability of unsafe collision never reaches 20% even
at the worst point of the strict-long case. This is a manageable situation since it is fairly
simple to keep vehicles out of the three to eight meter headway zone where the probability
of dangerous collision is measurable.
The loose distribution’s curves are not to be desired but are manageable if delay is
sufficiently short. This larger zone of high probability of unsafe collision will require careful
merging and splitting strategies.
While a probability of 1% seems low at first, when multiplied by the number of interac-
tions that might occur in an incident, which could easily reach thousands on a high-capacity,
automated highway, the numbers are sobering. It would be very difficult to keep platooning
safe in the loose-long case since there is quite high probability of dangerous collision even
at distances of one meter. In this case the highway may not use a platooning strategy,
with each vehicle following at the right side of the UHZ but this creates significant losses
in capacity.
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It is obvious that the change to a loose distribution has significant effects on the prob-
ability of collision. This indicates that efforts to make vehicles’ braking abilities matched
can yield great increases in safety. There is of course a trade-off. Keeping high perfor-
mance in all the vehicles requires higher design specifications, manufacturing tolerances,
and maintenance requirements, which can raise the cost of production and operation.
These probabilities describe collisions in an emergency scenario. For accurate analysis
of the implications on normal operational safety and performance the probability of an
emergency scenario occurring must be obtained. There is not yet any working model that
predicts the likelihood of an emergency scenario occurring in normal operation. System
designers can take preemptive measures to reduce risk of emergency scenarios. For example,
to prevent obstacles in the road, highways could be fenced or even enclosed. If emergency
events are found to be low enough in probability, designers could decide to accept the risks
of allowing vehicles to pass through or even operate in the UHZ. Significant work in this area
is required for a reasonable estimate on the overall safety of the system. While neither a
perfect model nor a perfectly safe system are possible, safety is a key factor for consideration
in system design. Until this data can be found, it is conservative to design around the UHZ
for acceptable safety limits.
2.8.2 Changing ∆vsafe
At this point is it useful to discuss another variable: ∆vsafe. While the value used is
based on the values used in similar work, it is possible to design a vehicle with larger crumple
zones such that it is able to withstand greater ∆v without increased risk to occupants.
Figures 2.16 and 2.17 show the probabilities that result when the success function threshold,
∆vsafe, is changed from 2.5m/s to 5m/s. The result shows that the system becomes much
easier to operate. No UHZ is measured under any strict case. Not until the mean surpasses
−9.35m/s2 is there any UHZ. While allowing more dangerous impacts does not increase
safety, the potential for increased capacity is compelling, provided vehicles can be made safe
enough to withstand such impacts. This is not unreasonable since the collisions involved are
strictly rear-end incidents, which are generally safer than head-on or t-bone type collisions.
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Conversely if designers were to decide that no collisions are acceptable in emergency
scenarios (∆vsafe = 0m/s) then the design task becomes much more difficult. Figures 2.19
and 2.18 suggest that a platooning system could not operate under requirement that no
impact can occur in emergency scenarios unless vehicles are nearly perfectly matched and
high performance. This is because there is near-unity probability of collision at very close
headways even under the strict-short case.
Thus, it appears the value used, vsafe = 2.5m/s is a good compromise between safety
and system capacity, though it was selected based on literature. Designers should keep in
mind that it is possible to have the benefits of allowing higher velocity impacts without
endangering occupants through appropriate vehicle design.
2.9 Chapter Conclusions
One of the primary considerations in system design is safety in an emergency brake
scenario. Collision severity is proportional to the difference in vehicles’ velocity (∆v) at
impact. This difference can be plotted as a function of initial headway (H). Vehicles can
be organized into platoons for large increases in system capacity. Platooning is safe under
certain conditions due to the shape of the H-∆v curve that shows low ∆v at very short
and very far headways. In between these safe regions lies the unsafe headway zone (UHZ)
defined as the initial headways that result in an impact ∆v greater than a safe threshold
(∆vsafe). A model is developed for investigation of system design. It is most conservative
to design vehicle maneuvers and the following distances such that vehicles always stay out
of the UHZ. Safety is most sensitive to variation in vehicles minimum acceleration value
(amin) such that if the follower cannot decelerate as quickly as the lead vehicle, safety is
most compromised. Using the UHZ Monte Carlo simulations can show the probability of
unsafe collisions with respect to headway. These plots show that safe platooning is easily
maintained if high vehicle and system performance is maintained, and safe platooning is still
achievable if performance is compromised. Coordinated braking and brake derating could
mitigate risks induced by performance degradation but are not investigated here. More
research on the probability and causes of emergency scenarios is required to create a full
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Fig. 2.16: Dangerous collision (∆vsafe = 5m/s) probability curves for strict and loose distri-
bution, delay sweeping 20ms intervals (note: no UHZ was observed in any strict distribution
curves).
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Fig. 2.17: Dangerous collision (∆vsafe = 5m/s) probability curves for short and long delay,
distribution mean sweeping 0.2m/s2 intervals.
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Fig. 2.18: Any collision (∆vsafe = 0m/s) probability curves for strict and loose distribution,
delay sweeping 20ms intervals.
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Fig. 2.19: Any collision (∆vsafe = 0m/s) probability curves for short and long delay, distri-
bution mean sweeping 0.2m/s2 intervals.
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analysis of system safety.
Some mention is made above of constrained merge and splitting techniques. Under
poorly distributed conditions, the author’s suggested technique would require additional
lanes such that a platoon that would add or remove members may exit into a maneuver
zone, reduce speed and reconfigure. This low speed region would negatively effect through-
put as well as require additional headway for special lanes, but if the system is found to
be ill-behaved enough then it may be in order. This could allow special ordering for pla-
toons to attempt the safest, most efficient configurations, and homogeneous intra-platoon
destinations which would remove the need for frequent delays at the maneuver zones. More
investigation of costs to traffic flow would provide additional insight to the effectiveness of
such strategies.
While these values are at once sobering and hopeful, it is clear that platooning is a
difficult task under highway conditions. The strict case especially seems rather optimistic
that all vehicles can lie bounded within 1-σ of the mean, but insufficient data was collected
to definitively say so. A study of the braking distributions of a large number of homogeneous
vehicles would prove invaluable to improve the accuracy of these results.
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Chapter 3
Physical Vehicle Modeling for the Emergency Brake Scenario
It has been shown that in the emergency brake scenario, safety is most sensitive to
disparity between the minimum accelerations of vehicles in a platoon. If decelerations
cannot be tightly controlled, capacity must suffer to maintain a constant safety threshold.
While this qualitative knowledge is important, it does not indicate what might be done in
vehicle and system design in order to maintain safe platooning.
This chapter builds on the previous results to provide basic guidelines in what charac-
teristics the vehicles must have in order to achieve predictable, controllable braking. These
guidelines can provide insight to what components of vehicle systems are the limiting factors
to implementing an AET system with today’s technology, thus indicating where additional
research might prove most profitable. Additionally, this work will help system designers
understand the restrictions that must be placed on a vehicle in order to make it capable for
safe AET use.
To achieve this physical analysis, a model is developed of the drivetrain of the ve-
hicle, then used to define the sensitivity of minimum acceleration to variation of several
parameters.
3.1 The Physical Model
The models developed in the previous chapter use abstractions of physical systems.
While capturing the behavior of the vehicles, they do not model any actual systems of the
vehicles. Here the main components of the drivetrain are modeled individually in order to
investigate the effects of varying parameters.
First the tire-road interaction model is developed, next the motor model, then the
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dynamics of the vehicle are set forth. For simplicity, the vehicle is assumed to be a direct-
drive system. A block diagram representing the model is shown in Figure 3.1.
3.1.1 The LuGre Model
The most significant nonlinear dynamic (and perhaps, most complicated) in a direct-
drive EV is the tire-road interaction. This is a complex friction problem that includes
Coulomb and static friction, the Stribeck effect, hysteresis, and many other phenomena.
Because the dynamics occur on a microscopic scale, most practical friction models devel-
oped are empirical. Specifically for tire-road interactions, the Pacejka model, or “Magic
formula” is common in the industry. This model uses many parameters to represent the
tire and road condition and composition. This model is accurate and easy to solve, but is
not appropriate for this analysis since the parameters must be identified from experimental
data and have no physical interpretation. In contrast, brush models represent the contact-
ing surfaces as bristles that have some elastic and adhesive characteristics corresponding to
the tire characteristics. These models however, assume that the bristles are bent to some
steady state position and thus do not capture transient behaviors. To include these tran-
sients, dynamic models have been developed. While not necessarily intended for tire-road
interactions they have been used for such. Several examples of dynamic friction models
are the Dahl, Bliman-Sorine, and LuGre models. For this analysis the LuGre model was
selected. It is based on a brush model, but includes a single dynamic state representing the
bristle deflection, capturing transient behavior.
While an empirical model may seem detrimental to the purpose of identifying physical
parameters that need regulation, most truly physical parameters for friction are so detailed
that they are useless to a designer. The LuGre model is a good abstraction of friction
Controller DC Motor
Vehicle
Dynamics
ω
a
V Tm
a∗ -
Fig. 3.1: Block diagram of physical vehicle model.
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dynamics that still has a physical interpretation and thus still provides insight to the system
characteristics.
The LuGre Model provides a relationship between relative velocity (vr) and the coef-
ficient of friction (µ). Relative velocity is the difference between the wheel rotational and
linear velocity.
vr = hω − v,
where h is the effective height of the wheel. Large positive vr correspond to “spinning out”
where the tire is rotating without propelling the vehicle forward (resulting in very small
µ). Large negative vr correspond to locking the brakes such that the tire is not spinning,
but the car is still moving forward. Large is of course relative since the threshold where
spinning or locking begins is dependent on the vehicle velocity. Most authors present curves
showing µ as a function of slip.
Slip (s) is the relative velocity normalized by either the rotational or the linear velocity
depending on whether accelerating or decelerating such that
s =

v−hω
v , Ftr < 0
0, Ftr = 0.
hω−v
hω , Ftr > 0
Notice that the cases are determined by the tractive force (Ftr) of the tire rather than the
net acceleration of the vehicle. Static curves showing this relationship between µ and s (such
as those described by the magic formula) are common in the literature. Many are taken
from Harned et al. [27]. These curves by Harned et al. indicate that the greatest coefficient
of friction (and thus greatest tractive force) is obtained when slip is approximately between
0.1 and 0.2, though it varies with velocity, road condition, and other factors.
Canudas de Wit and Tsiotras [28] use a desired slip of 0.15 and that is the value that
will be used here.
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The LuGre Model is of the form
g(vr) =µc + (µst − µc) e
−
√∣∣∣ vrvs ∣∣∣
z˙ =vr − θσ0 |vr|
g(vr)
z
µ =σ0z˙ + σ1z + σ2vr, (3.1)
where z is the state reflecting the average bristle deflection in the brush analogy. The
other parameters can be identified through experimental data. The parameters µst and
µc represent the Stribeck and Coulomb static friction coefficients. The σ1,2,3 represent
respectively the lumped spring, damper, and viscous relative damping effects of each bristle.
The Stribeck velocity is vs. The term θ is not part of the original LuGre model as presented
by Canudas de Wit et al. [29] but is introduced and used by Canudas de Wit et al. [30]
to represent variations in road or wheel conditions. Unity in θ represents uncompromised
conditions. Wet roads correspond to approximately θ = 2.5, and θ of four would be ice or
snow on the road. A similar approach can represent decreasing tire tread.
This model is strictly longitudinal. Two-dimensional LuGre models have been devel-
oped to account for lateral traction, but the model used for this work does not. When
vehicles turn, the lateral traction required takes away from the longitudinal tractive force
available. Should an emergency occur on a curve of the highway the results from the model
presented will be optimistic.
3.1.2 Actuator Modeling
A direct current (DC) motor model is used for the primary actuator of the EVs. This is
one of the simplest electrical machines to model and control which accounts for its ubiquitous
use in various applications. The DC motor model developed by Kenjo and Nagamori [31]
is used by Waltermann [32] for the propulsive actuator in a hybrid vehicle since it captures
well the dynamics of both synchronous and asynchronous electric motors.
The motor output torque is proportional to the current in the armature which has
42
inductance (L) and resistance (R). There is an additional term from the back electro-
motive force (emf), proportional to the motor’s rotational velocity (ω). Therefore, the
current (I) has dynamics
I˙ =
Vm −Keω −RI
L
,
where Vm is the input voltage and Ke is the back emf constant. Using the torque/current
motor constant Kt the output torque is simply calculated Tm = KtI.
3.1.3 Battery and Power System Modeling
The battery and power system are limited in the current and voltage available to the
motor. This is represented as a saturation limit Vmax on the voltage magnitude that is
applied to the motor.
3.1.4 Quarter Vehicle Model
It is assumed that each of the four wheels behave similarly so only one is modeled and
calculated. Since vertical and lateral dynamics of the vehicle are not considered, there is no
differentiating between the different wheels. The vehicle is subject to the aggregate force
of all four wheels, so the calculated force exerted by the single wheel is multiplied by four.
The tractive force is the product of the LuGre model friction coefficient and the vehicle
normal force.
Ftr = µFn = µMg
Aerodynamic drag is proportional to the square of the velocity times the drag coefficient
Cd. The longitudinal dynamics of the vehicle are
x˙ = v
v˙ = x¨ = a
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a =
4Ftr − Cdv2
M
,
where M is the vehicle mass.
Assuming the wheel is directly, rigidly attached to the motor the vehicle has the rota-
tional dynamics
ω˙ =
Tm − hFtr −Bω
J
,
where B is the rotational damping and J is the moment of inertia.
3.1.5 Vehicle Control
The input to the vehicle is a voltage while the output is an acceleration. The vehicle
controller must map these two unalike parameters such that the output is predictable and
controllable. This analysis is not specifically about this physical layer of control, therefore
a PI controller is implemented. While PATH and other groups made somewhat exotic
nonlinear sliding mode controllers for this task they were more especially focused on the
dynamics of the ICE and made simplifying assumptions about the tire-road interaction.
Since the actuator in an EV is a more linear device (especially in the case of the DC motor)
the vehicle will be better behaved even with a simple controller. Still, it is also anticipated
that unmodeled dynamics are likely to influence the vehicle behavior so the PI controller
is only loosely tuned to give the vehicle acceleration a settling time of about 30ms. In
implementation, a PID controller is used, for the case that future research warrants more
accurate physical layer control, but in this work the derivative gain is zero.
Above this physical layer of control lies the regulation layer. This layer of control
provides the desired acceleration to the physical layer. It determines the desired vehicle be-
havior based on measured and communicated information. This controller will be discussed
in depth in Chapter 4 below.
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3.1.6 The Complete Model
The model is implemented in Simulink and can be run from a script. Specifics of model
usage are described in Appendix B. The five states requiring integration in the model are
few enough that the model calculations can be quickly run, but offer enough detail that the
major dynamics of an AET vehicle are reflected.
This model makes some broad assumptions, foremost that the brake actuation is done
by the same electric motor used for traction. Though other braking methods are common
today, this is not unrealistic since direct drive vehicles are continuously under research
(i.e. [33–38]). Currently direct drive brake technology is somewhat limited since the electric
engines used are not usually able to provide the same levels of torque created by friction
braking of disc or drum brakes. For a common compact-sedan it takes more than 240
horsepower to achieve a deceleration of −10m/s2 and, if strictly regenerative braking is used,
the ability to absorb the energy in the battery or other storage is necessary. Direct braking
has the advantages that the torque of the motor is a fairly linear relationship to voltage
rather the complicated nonlinear friction dynamics in disc brakes, also most of the energy
consumed in braking can be converted to electrical energy rather than heat which is wasted.
There is even potential for harvesting surplus energy generated in long downhill sections.
Lastly, having lower braking capabilities could help maintain a tighter braking distribution,
the advantages of which are discussed in the previous chapter. In a constrained, AET
environment it is possible that vehicles, though equipped with disc brakes, would only
use engine braking while automated for greater efficiency and control. Other assumptions
include that the wheel is rigidly connected to the motor and that the significant dynamics
are included in the model.
The PI controller is based on negative feedback. This assumes the acceleration is
accurately measured. Noise in the feedback measurement is beyond the scope of this inves-
tigation. As is, the PI controller is only loosely tuned to introduce some imperfection in
control. PID control (from which PI is derived) is robust against variation and common in
literature (i.e. [12]).
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3.2 Model Verification
In developing such a model, it is useful to seek verification to ensure proper implemen-
tation and realistic results. Since this model is simply many common models put together,
verification is accomplished here in the form of reproduction of published results. Beginning
with recreating the results from an IEEE paper regarding the LuGre model, the results are
shown as each additional part of the model is added.
Canudas de Wit and Horowitz develop an observer to identify θ and the vehicle linear
velocity v using only information from a wheel rotation sensor [39]. This is tested through
varying θ while accelerating and decelerating. While the primary purpose in the article is
to prove the observer, but if the actual system behaves the same with the same input, it
shows a correct implementation. Canudas de Wit and Horowitz use a single wheel model
that does not include the viscous damping effect in the computation of wheel rotational
accelerations (such that σ2 = 0 in (3.1)). The other difference between this and the quarter
vehicle model developed above is that the tractive force is not scaled to represent four
wheels. For verification, the one wheel method is also used.
A torque profile as shown in Figure 3.2 is input while θ also varies according to the
other plot in Figure 3.2. The input parameter values published and used are shown in Table
3.1. The resulting friction coefficient and vehicle velocity is plotted with respect to time in
Figure 3.3. Comparison to plots in Canudas de Wit and Horowitz shows that the model
follows very closely to published results.
The next step is to show the effects of the DC motor model. This is accomplished simply
by using the same inputs and seeing if the outputs behave accordingly. The parameters
used for the motor are in Table 3.2. These values are drawn from Lovatt et al. [40], where
the motor designed is for a direct-drive, solar-powered vehicle. The resulting curves are
superimposed on the previous results for comparison in Figure 3.4. To make clear the
effects of adding the motor, the plots is Figure 3.5 show the difference of the two curves
between the previous figures.
It is apparent in the figures the low-pass filter characteristics of the motor smooth out
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Fig. 3.2: Torque (τ) and road condition (θ) profiles for validating the LuGre model imple-
mentation.
Table 3.1: LuGre model values used for verification.
Parameter Units Value
µc - 0.5
µst - 0.9
σ0 1/m 40
σ1 s/m 4.49487
σ2 s/m 0.0018
vs m/s 12.5
h m 0.25
m Kg 5
J Kgm2 0.2344
B Kgm2/s 1.2285
Fn N 14
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Fig. 3.3: Friction coefficient (µ) and vehicle velocity (v) output from LuGre model.
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Table 3.2: Values used for verification of DC motor.
Parameter Units Value
Lm µH 22
Rm Ω 0.1
Kemf Vs/rad 0.47
Kτ Nm/A 0.49
0 5 10 15 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Time (s)
F
ri
ct
io
n
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
LuGre Only
DC Motor
0 5 10 15 20
0
5
10
Time (s)
V
eh
ic
le
V
el
o
ci
ty
(m
/s
)
LuGre Only
DC Motor
Fig. 3.4: Vehicle velocity (v) output from different model configurations.
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Fig. 3.5: Difference in friction coefficient (µ) and in vehicle velocity (v) output from includ-
ing DC motor with model.
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the changes in coefficient of friction which directly affects acceleration. Figure 3.5 shows that
this smoothing does not have significant effect on the velocity and since all vehicles would
be actuated through this same method it has benefits to rider comfort without greatly com-
promising the performance. Because of this low-pass filter characteristic, there is no need
to model an automatic braking system (ABS) or other traction control. Implementation of
such an ABS system shows no change in the results from the DC motor.
3.3 Parameters Subject to Variation
There are infinitely many things that can happen to any system, but many situations
are so rare they need not be considered. Thus tire inflation and battery state of charge
are considered, but alien abduction and black holes are not. Other physical parameters
considered are tire tread condition, coefficient of aerodynamic friction, and payload (mass).
It is difficult to represent a system as complex as a vehicle, which is why simplification
is so common in modeling. Representing variation in an organized manner can be especially
difficult. Often the parameters are correlated in some way and since there is not a physical
vehicle available where all parameters can be measured as the equipment is worn over
thousands of miles, the variation must be modeled using simplifying assumptions. For
example, the inflation of a tire would surely affect all the parameters in the LuGre model, but
it is simplified to only a change in effective radius. This is justified through the assumption
that inflation does not have a great effect on coefficient of friction, as confirmed by MacIsaac
and Garrott [41]. A 50% decrease in pressure only created approximately seven percent
decrease in the maximum friction coefficient. Similarly tire tread variation is represented
using the model variable θ used by Canudas de Wit et al. [30] for general road or tire
variations.
The aerodynamic drag coefficient is defined explicitly in the model, but variation rep-
resents either a change in the vehicle shape or surface. If vehicles are not allowed external
payloads this can easily be controlled. The effects of drafting as vehicles follow very closely
will have influence on this term, but the relationship is very complex.
The state of charge of the battery is significant because when batteries are in a low
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state of charge the full voltage is not available. While AET vehicles have the benefit of
charging while on the highway the possibility exists that an emergency situation occurs
immediately after some vehicle has just entered the automated lane with a low battery.
3.4 Variation in amin
Safety is most sensitive to variation in amin between vehicles in a platoon, as previously
found in Chapter 2. To put the physical parameter variation in context of the previous chap-
ter, parameters were varied until the amin values used for the strict and loose distributions
(summarized in Table 2.2) were reached. The input to the model described in Section 3.1
was changed to have a vehicle immediately decelerate from an initial velocity of v0 = 30m/s
until the vehicle has stopped. Minimum acceleration is achieved by inputing negative infin-
ity as the controller reference. Since actual deceleration varies with respect to velocity, the
value for amin is taken to be the mean value of acceleration during the simulation.
The vehicle parameter values used for this analysis are drawn from Yi et al. [42] in-
cluding parameters for the LuGre model. These values represent Buick LeSabres used in
PATH’s research which are much larger vehicles than AET vehicles are likely to be, pro-
viding more conservative results. The values are summarized in Table 3.3. The DC motor
model parameters are kept at those values used for model validation shown in Table 3.2.
For the parameters to be varied (θ, h, Vmax, Cd, and m) the values in Table 3.3 are the
nominal values held while each is individually degraded until the amin reaches the desired
value. The resulting parameter values are shown in Table 3.4. Aerodynamic drag varied
in this way does not produce enough effect on amin to reach the values desired and so is
not shown. Reducing effective wheel radius actually improves braking, since less torque is
required for the same tractive force, and increasing radius seems an unrealistic variation,
so the results are not shown. Since lower tire pressure increases the contact patch between
the wheel and the road, this outcome is probably accurate.
In Table 3.4 it can be seen that, similar to aerodynamic drag coefficient, the parameter
for tire condition θ is a weak parameter, unable to influence amin enough to cause the full
range of variation explored in Chapter 2. Since this is the most difficult parameter to draw
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Table 3.3: Values used in physical vehicle model.
Parameter Symbol Units Value
Mass m kg 1707
Tire Radius h m 0.323
Rotational Inertia J Kgm2 2.603
Rotational Damping B Kgm2/s 1.2257
Aerodynamic Drag Coeff. Cd - 0.3693
Max Voltage Vmax V ±250
Tire Condition θ - 1
Coulomb Friction Coeff. µc - 0.35
Static Friction Coeff. µst - 0.5
Spring Factor σ0 1/m 100
Damping Factor σ1 s/m 0.7
Viscous Friction Factor σ2 s/m 0.011
Stribeck Velocity vs m/s 10
Table 3.4: Values used to achieve amin.
Parameter Units −10 −9.5 −9 −7.75 −5.5
θ - - 1.90 2.65 11.52 -
Vmax V 263.5 248.7 233.9 196.9 130.8
m kg 1619 1710 1810 2119 3028
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a physical interpretation, this does not conclusively prove that tire condition is not an issue,
it rather suggests that this model may not accurately represent such variation. A University
of Michigan study indicates that as a vehicle’s tire tread depth decreases from seven to zero
millimeters at 60mph the peak coefficient of friction goes from about 0.9 to about 0.6 on
wet pavements [43], however for this work the topic is left for future research.
Variation in the state of charge is able to reach such values but must make nearly 50%
deviation from the nominal value to reach the extreme of −5.5m/s2. Since batteries are
designed to maintain as constant a voltage as possible, it seems unlikely that this extreme
will be reached even in unusual operational circumstances. It is also possible that if vehicles
have a low enough state of charge at check-in they could be sent to a stationary charging
station until a safer state is reached.
The final parameter is vehicle mass. While, like the state of charge, the full range of
−10 to −5.5m/s2 requires nearly doubling the mass, it is easily conceivable for some homoge-
neous vehicles to have several 70−90kg passengers with baggage that contribute significant
variations to the vehicle mass. The nominal vehicle mass used is from an ICE vehicle. An
AET EV is likely to be much lighter since there is no need for a large, heavy battery pack
or combustion engine. This would make variation due to passenger and payload mass much
higher, but has the benefit that all vehicles have better braking to begin with. If all vehicles
account for the heaviest vehicle, that vehicle being only as massive as today’s sedans, then
the lighter vehicles can derate braking to an easily manageable level, preventing braking
saturation in the heavier vehicles, while still braking quickly overall. When development
of real AET vehicles proceeds, the unloaded mass and the range of passenger and payload
mass that will be possible must be carefully considered in order to analyze the variation in
vehicle braking ability. Smaller vehicles that allow few passengers or cargo are less prone
to variation, but can also be less convenient, useful, or comfortable.
3.5 Chapter Conclusions
A quarter-vehicle model is developed, incorporating the LuGre model to represent
the tire-road interaction. The complete model has only five states requiring integration.
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Physical parameters such as tire condition, battery charge, and vehicle mass have direct
effect on the minimum acceleration. Battery state of charge and mass have greater effect
than aerodynamic drag or tire condition, though tire condition still deserves investigation.
In order to achieve strict braking distribution, mass and state of charge should be controlled
as much as possible. The author is of the opinion that mass will play the largest single
role in braking variation of AET vehicles. In reality the most likely cause of variation in
braking ability will not be a large variation of a single parameter, but a combination of soft
faults that each contribute to a dangerous compromise in braking ability. As AET vehicles
are developed and hardware is being specified and selected, the likelihood of performance
degradation, not just complete failure, must be considered. These results reinforce that
variation is inevitable, and very careful measures must be taken to control variance as
much as possible and design conservatively to account for a wide range of operation.
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Chapter 4
Emergency Braking of a Full Platoon
The analyses above are all focused on the interactions of two vehicles in emergency brake
scenarios. The models only represent events up until the point that an impact occurs. In
this chapter the analysis is extended to a full platoon of five vehicles and includes an impact
model such that the entire emergency scenario can be analyzed from full speed to a complete
stop regardless of whether collisions occur. This model is used to reinforce the previous
results, showing that variation in minimum acceleration has significant consequences, as
well as suggest that correct ordering may mitigate the effects of variation.
4.1 Modeling the Platoon
The platoon is a collection of consecutive vehicles with intercommunication to achieve
cooperative control, ideally acting as a single unit. In the platoon, several instances of the
model developed in Chapter 3 are used, each being one of the vehicles. Said model de-
scribes the operation of the individual vehicles yet they are interconnected through wireless
communication and sensing. Modeling of the wireless interconnects follows.
4.1.1 Communication
A simple model of communication is used, incorporating a constant delay on any signals
communicated between vehicles. The model infrastructure is established so that much
more complex and accurate models could be implemented for future use. Each vehicle
communicates its own acceleration and velocity, and whether an emergency scenario has
been detected.
In emergencies, it is likely desirable for vehicles to switch a new regulation layer control
strategy that only operates in emergency conditions. Ideally all vehicles switch to the
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emergency control at the same time, but due to communication delay some vehicles are
aware of the emergency before others. Two types of emergency signal propagation are
implemented: a serial propagation, where each vehicle receives the information one delay
time after the preceding vehicle receives it, and a parallel propagation, where when one
vehicle indicates an emergency all vehicles receive it at the same time.
Serial propagation is based on a communication architecture where each vehicle passes
information along a direct link to the one following it. This has the advantage that accurate
directional wireless links can be established, making high-speed communication possible,
but presents security concerns as one malicious vehicle can easily forge or tamper with
communicated information.
The parallel propagation is typical in a token-bus type communication architecture
where all vehicles share a channel and use time division multiplexing to determine when
one may communicate. All vehicles in such a system receive the same communication, but
typically disregard the information coming from vehicles that are not immediately preceding
them or leading the platoon. This is the communication architecture used by PATH [23]
and is the one primarily considered in the analysis below.
4.1.2 Sensing
Like communication, a framework is put in the model to allow retrofitting with other
sensor models, but only a simple one is used here. Headway to the preceding vehicle is
measured as well as each vehicle’s own speed and acceleration. This sensing model does
not include any nonlinearities or dynamics. The information in this simplistic model comes
from the actual vehicle states, but it passes through the sensor system, which later can
incorporate noise, quantization, and other errors.
4.2 Regulation Layer Controller
Where the task of the physical layer controller is to linearize the vehicle such that
it tracks the desired acceleration, the task of the regulation layer is to tell the physical
layer what desired acceleration will achieve correct behavior. This is accomplished through
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a combination of the measured and communicated information. A safe acceleration is
calculated that will maintain string stability. The regulation layer is named so because it
regulates the vehicle motion based on the situation of the platoon. It is also given to the
regulation layer controller to maintain passenger comfort.
Vehicle control has been heavily researched. One controller developed by PATH that is
often referenced in literature is that of Rajamani et al. [44]. This sliding mode controller uses
preceding vehicle and leader acceleration and velocity, where many previous controllers also
required position information to achieve string stability [45]. Though it has been shown that
the string stability of this controller erodes as communication delay is introduced, it is simple
enough to implement without extensive knowledge of the vehicles or the communication
channel.
The controller is of the form:
x¨∗i =(1− C1)x¨i−1 + C1x¨l −
(
2ζ − C1
(
ζ +
√
ζ2 − 1
))
ωn˙i
− C1
(
ζ +
√
ζ2 − 1
)
ωn(x˙i − x˙l)− ω2ni
where x is the position, the spacing error  is defined as
i = xi−1 − xi − li−1 +H∗, (4.1)
li being the length of the i
th vehicle and H∗ being the desired headway. Note that the
vehicles move in the positive x direction. The l index is used for the leader instead of a one,
for clarity.
Rajamani et al. shows this controller to be string stable under the conditions ζ ≥ 1
and C1 < 1. The gains and the values used in the controller for this analysis are found in
Table 4.1. The leader information bias is set such that the leader and preceding vehicle
information are considered equally. The damping ratio is set to critical damping, and the
bandwidth is set very low, five radians per second, in order to improve rider comfort. In
Godbole and Lygeros [46] and others, levels of jerk above five meters per second cubed are
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considered uncomfortable. Thus the bandwidth is selected such that acceleration frequencies
that contain such levels of jerk are attenuated. To further promote passenger comfort, the
output of the controller is limited to magnitudes of two meters per second per second or
less, as also done by Godbole and Lygeros in the PATH program.
This controller is sufficient for the analysis here since the emergency brake scenario
is that being investigated. This controller will be used for only a few seconds in order to
better represent occurrence of the emergency brake scenario at a random time.
4.2.1 Leader Control
At this level, the control of the leader during normal operation is more a problem of
automatic cruise control than platoon control. Here the leader actually uses the Rajamani
controller but uses the platoon desired velocity (v∗) in place of the leader velocity. Using the
Rajamani controller in this way is like having the leader follow a “ghost car” which perfectly
maintains the desired speed and headway in front of the leader. The lack of acceleration or
spacing error between the leader and this imaginary ghost car makes all other terms go to
zero.
x¨∗l =
(
ζ +
√
ζ2 − 1
)
ωn(x˙l − v∗)
The platoon desired velocity comes from the coordination layer which controls overall pla-
toon behavior and interactions between platoons. The coordination layer is not modeled as
only one platoon is being represented.
Table 4.1: Gain values and interpretation for physical layer controller.
Gain Interpretation Value
C1 Leader information weighting 0.5
ζ Damping ratio 1
ωn Controller bandwidth 5
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4.2.2 Emergency Control
The topic at hand is safe vehicle behavior during emergency scenarios, so several con-
trollers were implemented and tested. In each controller tested, the desired acceleration of
the platoon leader is changed to an exogenously determined value selected for emergency
braking aemergency. The first control scheme attempted was to not switch controllers at all,
other than the leader’s as just noted.
The next control method is suggested by Choi and Darbha [47], who use analytical
means to determine that it is better for all vehicles to match the acceleration of the pre-
ceding vehicle rather than any combination of preceding vehicle and leader acceleration.
The reasoning is should a vehicle reach a braking saturation and have a collision, the fol-
lowing vehicles can brake at the lesser deceleration value of the saturated vehicle, reducing
probability that vehicles further back in the platoon saturate, while still maintaining safe
separations. Choi and Darbha explain this as the platoon breaking into subplatoons, each
being led by a vehicle with saturated braking, all other vehicles in the platoon matching
the subplatoon leader’s acceleration. This establishes monotonically decreasing acceleration
through the platoon. Here the controller is implemented by using the Rajamani controller
and changing C1 to zero, making the leader information not considered at all. A better
implementation would be to actually change the leader information used by each vehicle to
be the information of the subplatoon leader, the nearest preceding vehicle that has reached
braking saturation, but this increases complexity significantly as it requires a method for
subplatoon leaders’ information be designated as the new leader information.
Another method tried, a variation of the Choi method, has each vehicle simply try to
match the acceleration of the preceding vehicle. Referred to as the preceding acceleration
method hereafter, in implementation, this controller is
x¨∗l = aemergency,
x¨∗i = x¨i−1.
This controller is additionally limited to output negative values so that even if an impact
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occurs no vehicle is commanded to accelerate, but passenger comfort limits are not enforced
in emergency scenarios.
An alternative builds upon the preceding acceleration controller to include the headway
error measurement, so each vehicle seeks to also maintain the desired headway or greater
in addition to the preceding vehicle’s acceleration. The equations then become
x¨∗l = aemergency,
x¨∗i = x¨i−1 + ,
where  is the spacing error as defined in (4.1). This spacing error, though increasing the
probability of saturation, helps keep the vehicles from colliding. This will be referred to as
the preceding acceleration with headway (PAH) controller.
The final method used is simply to have all vehicles seek to hold the same predetermined
target deceleration. This means no actual coordination once the emergency scenario is
initiated. This has the advantage that the entire communication channel is then free to
communicate the emergency signal to other vehicles, rather than trying to communicate
state information as well. The emergency braking is also more robust to certain delays
since the controller is no longer dependent on communication. Headway feedback from the
sensors is also used here. This controller is referred to as the uncoordinated method as
all vehicles are attempting to keep the same predetermined deceleration without sharing
information directly. The controller follows the equations
x¨∗l = aemergency,
x¨∗i = aemergency + .
These methods are all dependent on appropriate choice of aemergency but to varying de-
grees. Too low a value (remembering that it is negative) results in many vehicles saturating
while too high a value does not stop the platoon quickly. If the minimum acceleration is
desired, aemergency = −∞m/s2 can be used, but this creates a large probability that there will
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be collisions due to variation in vehicle masses. This is where Choi’s suggestion is designed
to have the advantage since no vehicle is required to brake harder than the preceding one,
reducing probability of collisions even if the platoon leader is braking very hard. Theoreti-
cally, this will stop the platoon with the fewest primary collisions as fast as possible. The
uncoordinated method, in contrast, is the most dependent on the choice of aemergency since
every vehicle with amin > aemergency will saturate braking.
The value used here for the controllers is aemergency = −10m/s2. This is below the
nominal vehicle’s ability and will saturate some vehicles, but it is still reachable by the
strongest braking vehicles.
4.3 Impact Dynamics
While the vehicles are wirelessly connected through communication, sensing, and con-
trol, if an impact occurs, the vehicles have a physical connection and there are additional
dynamics between the vehicles.
Collision dynamics are very complicated in the general case, but collisions between
vehicles are often modeled to analyze collisions for legal purposes [48]. One simple model
developed for such analysis is developed by Brach [49]. This variation of the Hunt-Crossley
model is developed empirically to represent the impulse curves between vehicles colliding,
specifically in front to back accidents at lower speeds. This is the collision type expected
to occur in platooning emergencies. Brach describes lower speeds as those below 9m/s. This
is advantageous as the general strategy of platooning safety is based upon keeping ∆v low
and, as indicated by Brach, other models are not accurate in low ∆v calculations as will be
primarily studied here.
The model describes the contact force as
FCi =

cdmp(x˙i − x˙i−1)b(xi − xi−1 − li−1)c + k(xi − xi−1)a, xi − xi−1 ≤ li
0, xi − xi−1 > li,
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cdmp =

c′dmp, t ≤ tp
c′dmp
(
t
tp
)d
, t > tp,
where c′dmp is a damping constant, k is a stiffness coefficient, tp is the time of the peak force,
and a, b, c, and d are constants used to match measured data. The values used are drawn
from an example given in the same paper, shown here in Table 4.2.
This collision model covers the damping caused by crumple zones and also the spring-
like restorative force, but the changes in vehicle length due to crumple are not accounted
for. This has the largest effect in simulations where the vehicles have multiple impacts. The
first crushes the crumple zone, leaving less (or no) material damping from crumple when
the subsequent collisions occur. This model effectively resets the car to its undamaged state
as soon as contact between the vehicles is lost.
The contact force is equal and opposite between colliding vehicles. When impacts
are occurring, each vehicle has a net force from the gross preceding and following vehicle
collision forces. In an n vehicle platoon the net force is calculated as
FCinet =

FCi, i = 1
FCi − FCi−1, i = 2, 3 . . . n− 1
−FCi−1, i = n
,
Table 4.2: Values used for collision model.
Parameter Units Value
c′dmp kNs/m2 95.8
k kN/m 73
tp s 0.07
a - 1
b - 1
c - 1
d - 3
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which makes the complete longitudinal vehicle dynamics for each vehicle,
x˙ = v
v˙ = x¨ = a
a =
4Ftr − Cdv2 + FCinet
M
.
4.4 Simulation
A platoon of five vehicles is assembled with a desired following distance of one meter.
The vehicles travel for one second of normal operation to better simulate the small errors
that are likely to be present during normal operation, creating more realistic initial con-
ditions for the emergency. After one second of travel, an emergency brake is initiated by
the leader who immediately switches to the emergency controller. The emergency signal is
transmitted to the following vehicles which all receive it at the same time and switch to
emergency control. The details of the Simulink implementation are found in Appendix B.
4.4.1 Metrics
The emergency situation calls for all vehicles to stop as quickly as possible, while
(ideally) collisions within the platoon are reduced or eliminated. Unsafe collisions however,
are not acceptable. Thus several metrics of importance can be used to interpret the data:
the peak collision force, vehicle acceleration, the total time to stop, the vehicle jerk, and,
as discussed in Chapter 2, the ∆v. These will each be used in the discussion of the results.
The peak force in the impact is a good indicator of the damages done to the vehicle.
The larger the force, the deeper into the crumple zone the imposing vehicle reaches. As
force rises, the chance of injury to occupants rises, though the threshold that results in
injury, as well as the cost of damages done varies a great deal, so quantization of these
matters is beyond the scope of this research.
The peak force gives some indication to passenger safety, but in complex pile-up col-
lisions (as may occur in a platoon) impact forces come from forward and behind so the
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net force is not as great. The net force manifests in the vehicle acceleration, thus rather
than include an additional plot, acceleration is used in the discussion. Acceleration is often
a key metric in analyzing passenger safety in collisions such as the analysis of whiplash-
associated-disorders (WAD) by Krafft et al. [50].
The time to stop should be minimized, since the cause of emergency brake scenarios is
not fully researched. If the braking is due to an object in the road, compromise in stopping
time (and the resulting longer stopping distance) will have significant changes to safety.
Jerk contributes to rider comfort but also to safety. Hynes and Dickey [51] show that
the magnitude of jerk changes the head accelerations that lead to WAD even if the vehicle
acceleration is the same magnitude. While no threshold for safety is given, in general lesser
magnitude is better. Jerk is the derivative of acceleration, so sharp corners or cusps in the
acceleration curve are undesirable.
4.4.2 Five Vehicle Platoon with Random Masses
The vehicles are assigned masses from a distribution with mean at the nominal 1707kg
and variance of 6400kg corresponding approximately to a strict braking distribution as
found in the results of Chapter 3. The resulting masses are listed in Table 4.3. While
vehicle three is less massive than the nominal, this is not unacceptable, since it is likely
AET vehicles will be lighter than the Buick LeSabres of the 1990s that the nominal values
are taken from. However, the overall range of 327kg seems a fairly significant amount of
variation if the vehicles are of homogeneous type. The operating range of mass of AET
vehicles must be determined before qualifications can be made about the reasonableness of
Table 4.3: Masses of vehicles in random-ordered platoon.
Vehicle Mass (Kg)
1 1750.0
2 1853.7
3 1526.3
4 1776.0
5 1732.5
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this variance.
For each controller implemented the acceleration and velocity of each vehicle and the
headway and collision force between vehicles are plotted. The resulting curves are shown
in Figure 4.1 for the Rajamani controller method, Figure 4.2 for the Choi method, and
Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 for the preceding acceleration, PAH, and uncoordinated method
controllers, respectively. The ∆v of the initial impacts are summarized in Table 4.4 along
with the peak impact forces in Table 4.5 and the time required to stop the platoon for each
controller is shown in Table 4.6.
Note that because the braking is performed through the direct-drive motors, when the
vehicle reaches a stop the regulation layer controller must switch to have desired acceleration
zero or the vehicle will begin moving in reverse. This switching causes chatter seen at the
end of the acceleration plots of Figures 4.4 and 4.5.
From Table 4.4 it is apparent that the collision between the second vehicle and the
leader is not avoidable under these conditions and that ∆v between said vehicles does not
vary, regardless of the controller. This is simply due to the braking disparity caused by the
100kg extra mass in vehicle two. This can easily be the difference of a single passenger and
exhibits the consequence of disparity in braking ability caused by mass variation. Fortu-
nately, as designed, the vehicles are following closely enough that ∆v is still less than half
of ∆vsafe = 2.5m/s as assumed in Chapter 2.
Table 4.5 shows that even though ∆v is the same, the peak force of the collision
does change depending on controller. The collision with lowest ∆v (between vehicles two
and three under preceding acceleration control) also had greatest peak force. These results
indicate the assumptions made relating ∆v to safety are only somewhat accurate in multiple
vehicle situations. This is possibly due to pileup effect, since vehicles behind push the others
into more severe collisions.
The Rajamani and Choi controllers have practically identical output in this scenario.
It is possible that the benefits described by Choi are not manifest until the platoon is larger
than only five cars. With the current platoon setup both controllers perform very well, with
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Fig. 4.1: Results of random-ordered platoon in emergency brake scenario using Rajamani
controller.
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Fig. 4.2: Results of random-ordered platoon in emergency brake scenario using Choi con-
troller.
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Fig. 4.3: Results of random-ordered platoon in emergency brake scenario using preceding
acceleration controller.
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Fig. 4.4: Results of random-ordered platoon in emergency brake scenario using PAH con-
troller.
68
1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4
−10
−5
0
Time (s)
A
cc
el
er
at
io
n
(m
/s
2
)
0 1 2 3 4
0
10
20
30
Time (s)
V
el
o
ci
ty
(m
/s
)
2-1 3-2 4-3 5-4
0 1 2 3 4
0
1
2
Time (s)
V
eh
ic
le
H
ea
d
w
ay
(m
)
0 1 2 3 4
0
5
10
Time (s)
Im
p
ac
t
F
or
ce
(k
N
)
Fig. 4.5: Results of random-ordered platoon in emergency brake scenario using uncoordi-
nated controller.
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the lowest collision force and low stopping time.
Tables 4.4 through 4.6 illustrate clearly that the preceding acceleration method is not
adequate. It is the only controller that caused multiple collisions and has the longest
stop time. Figure 4.3 shows under this control there is significant jerk and the impact
forces are the greatest, though the actual accelerations are not greater than those of the
other controllers. This poor performance is because rear-end collisions accelerate a vehicle
forward, causing the following vehicle to accelerate to match rather than brake harder,
exacerbating the crash. That this controller does not work well is not surprising with
consideration that it uses the least amount of information and the acceleration information
it does use is delayed through the communication channel.
The PAH controller performs well in the stopping time, but has double the impact
forces of the Rajamani and Choi controllers. Perhaps tuning with a gain for the spacing
error term could improve performance, but other controllers already developed outperform
it. The final controller is the uncoordinated controller. It is the fastest stopping overall, since
all vehicles were attempting to brake at aemergency though the time difference is only 0.02s.
The impact that occurs has slightly more force than that in the Rajamani and Choi control
schemes. This indicates that the headway measurement is a larger contributer to safety
than communicating acceleration as done by the PAH controller. This observation is weak
however because of the assumptions made in the sensing and communication models. The
headway measurement is perfect, continuous and instantaneous, whereas the communication
is perfect, continuous, and delayed 20ms.
Table 4.4: ∆v of impacts in random-ordered platoon under different control strategies.
∆v (m/s)
Vehicles Rajamani Choi Prec. Acc. PAH Uncoord.
2-1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
3-2 - - 0.4 - -
4-3 - - 0.5 - -
5-4 - - 0.5 - -
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Table 4.5: Peak impact force in random-ordered platoon under different control strategies.
FC (N)
Vehicles Rajamani Choi Prec. Acc. PAH Uncoord.
2-1 8803 8800 19296 17992 09412
3-2 - - 36509 - 0
4-3 - - 34420 - 0
5-4 - - 18791 - 0
Table 4.6: Time to stop a random-ordered platoon under different control strategies.
Controller Stop Time (s)
Rajamani 4.39
Choi 4.39
Prec. Acc. 9.05
PAH 4.91
Uncoord. 4.37
4.4.3 Five Vehicle Platoon with Heaviest Vehicle in Rear
The order of the vehicles in the platoon is switched so that the most massive is the last
vehicle in the platoon, the others remaining the same. This is generally the least desirable
arrangement as the vehicles in front will surely have superior braking over the final vehicle,
the absolute worst arrangement being monotonically increasing mass with each vehicle. The
masses as now arranged are shown in Table 4.7. This arrangement is to provide additional
insight to the performance of the controllers under poor platoon ordering.
The resulting curves are shown in Figures 4.6 through 4.10 in the same order as previ-
ously displayed. The ∆v of the initial impacts are shown in Table 4.8, collision force peaks
in Table 4.9, and the stopping time in Table 4.10.
Table 4.7: Masses of vehicles in heaviest-in-rear platoon.
Vehicle Mass (Kg)
1 1750.0
2 1526.3
3 1776.0
4 1732.5
5 1853.7
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Fig. 4.6: Results of heaviest-in-rear platoon in emergency brake scenario using Rajamani
controller.
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Fig. 4.7: Results of heaviest-in-rear platoon in emergency brake scenario using Choi con-
troller.
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Fig. 4.8: Results of heaviest-in-rear platoon in emergency brake scenario using preceding
acceleration controller.
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Fig. 4.9: Results of heaviest-in-rear platoon in emergency brake scenario using PAH con-
troller.
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Fig. 4.10: Results of heaviest-in-rear platoon in emergency brake scenario using uncoordi-
nated controller.
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Once again the most massive vehicle consistently collides with the preceding vehicle,
regardless of the controller used. In this case as Table 4.8 shows, the ∆v for this vehicle are
all very similar, attributable to the consistent one-meter spacing of the platoon. However,
again the peak collision forces vary, especially in the preceding acceleration and PAH cases
where pileups occur. In these results however, it is more clear that peak impact force is
generally proportional to ∆v when pileups do not occur.
The Rajamani controller had a faster stopping time than the Choi in this case, since
under the Choi controller the fourth vehicle was effectively pushed into the third by the
most massive fifth (see the headways in Figure 4.7). The difference in control that caused
this behavior is the leader brake maneuver information that reaches the other vehicles
earlier so they begin reacting earlier rather than waiting for only the vehicle ahead to begin
reacting. The difference in velocity that results is very small (indeed, Figures 4.6 and 4.7
seem nearly identical, observe the headway between vehicles three and four to notice), but
this difference is enough that the Rajamani controlled vehicles come to a complete stop
before a second collision occurs. This indicates that under constraints of communication
delay the benefits Choi suggests begin to degrade. Admittedly, the implementation here
is not a full realization of the strategy posed by Choi, only one inspired by it. A proper
implementation where subplatoon leader information is communicated is necessary to fully
explore the merit of Choi’s work.
The preceding acceleration controller actually improved in stopping time, but still pales
in comparison with the others in all the metrics. The PAH controller was slower in stopping
time than in the last scenario and had collisions between every vehicle, two of which are
Table 4.8: ∆v of impacts in heaviest-in-rear platoon under different control strategies.
∆v (m/s)
Vehicles Rajamani Choi Prec. Acc. PAH Uncoord.
2-1 - - 0.7 3.8 -
3-2 - - 0.7 0.7 1.3
4-3 - 0.6 0.6 2.9 -
5-4 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.0
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Table 4.9: Peak impact force in heaviest-in-rear platoon under different control strategies.
FC (N)
Vehicles Rajamani Choi Prec. Acc. PAH Uncoord.
2-1 - - 22466 92973 0
3-2 - - 36564 36505 15282
4-3 - 4890 33449 66922 0
5-4 8577 8534 18470 21398 10890
Table 4.10: Time to stop a heaviest-in-rear platoon under different control strategies.
Controller Stop Time (s)
Rajamani 4.39
Choi 4.41
Prec. Acc. 8.39
PAH 5.22
Uncoord. 4.38
over ∆vsafe. The impact forces are the largest generated in all the experiments performed
here, with large acceleration and jerk on the vehicle. This control scheme is clearly unsafe
with the most massive vehicle in the back. This is because all the vehicles are braking at
saturation and so the additional braking required to preserve headway is unavailable. In the
random-ordered platoon case above, the most massive vehicle was in the second position
and would saturate at greater acceleration and the vehicles behind could more easily achieve
the acceleration required to follow.
Finally, the uncoordinated case has the shortest stopping time but shows a weakness
that the Rajamani and Choi controllers are able to avoid through communication. Each
vehicle that follows a less massive vehicle (vehicles three and five) collides, with ∆v values
still below ∆vsafe but greater than those of the other controllers save the PAH. The larger
collision forces correlate with ∆v.
4.4.4 Five Vehicle Platoon with Heaviest Vehicle as Leader
Finally, the platoon is set into a safer ordering with the most massive vehicle being in
front as indicated by the masses in Table 4.11. This is not as ideal as a perfectly ordered
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platoon with monotonically decreasing mass between each vehicle.
Figures 4.11 through 4.15 show the resulting curves in the same order as previously
displayed. The ∆v of the initial impacts are shown in Table 4.12, collision forces in Table
4.13, and the stopping time in Table 4.14.
Comparing these results to the previous two cases make it clear why SARTRE is
designing their platooning system such that large cargo trucks are always lead vehicles with
passenger cars as followers [10]. Collisions did not occur under the Rajamani and Choi
control schemes and stopping times were only affected by 0.7% of the random order.
The preceding acceleraton controller continued to prove the least of controllers tried,
with longer stopping time, collisions between every vehicle with greater impact forces than
the PAH or uncoordinated cases. The PAH shows significant improvement with only one
collision with ∆v = 0.3m/s and collision force of only one fifth of the force that occurs
in the random-ordered platoon case. The uncoordinated case again shows weakness with
the largest ∆v and impact force of the group save again the preceding acceleration control
scheme.
Testing the five emergency controllers under these three cases, random-order, heaviest-
in-rear, and heaviest-as-lead, shows several things. First is the performance comparisons of
the control schema as already discussed. The Rajamani controller proved the safest overall
through the three cases.
The second concept shown through these simulation results is the benefit of coordina-
tion. The uncoordinated controller performed well in all cases but was outperformed by
the Rajamani with regard to collision force, especially in the heaviest-in-rear and heaviest-
Table 4.11: Masses of vehicles in heaviest-as-lead platoon.
Vehicle Mass (Kg)
1 1853.7
2 1750.0
3 1526.3
4 1776.0
5 1732.5
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Fig. 4.11: Results of heaviest-as-lead platoon in emergency brake scenario using Rajamani
controller.
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Fig. 4.12: Results of heaviest-as-lead platoon in emergency brake scenario using Choi con-
troller.
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Fig. 4.13: Results of heaviest-as-lead platoon in emergency brake scenario using preceding
acceleration controller.
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Fig. 4.14: Results of heaviest-as-lead platoon in emergency brake scenario using PAH con-
troller.
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Fig. 4.15: Results of heaviest-as-lead platoon in emergency brake scenario using uncoordi-
nated controller.
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as-lead cases where additional collisions occurred. Even the subtle difference between the
Rajamani and Choi control schemes appeared under the heaviest-in-rear case with the ad-
ditional coordination through use of leader information giving the advantage.
The final concept illustrated is the safety gain of organizing the platoon by braking
ability (represented here with mass). Under the Rajamani and Choi controllers collisions
were avoided entirely with the most massive vehicle as leader, despite having other vehicles
in the platoon following less massive ones. The number and severity of collisions is reduced
under every controller when ordered this way. Conversely, with the most massive vehicle
as the last, safety suffered under every control scheme. Keeping a platoon ordered with
monotonically increasing braking ability is difficult if the UHZ is small enough that merging
and splitting from the platoon must be restricted. If only the leader is required to be most
massive, other vehicles occurring in random order, it eases this task some. This topic and
the resulting effects on traffic flow warrants investigation as the benefits to safety are clear.
Table 4.12: ∆v of impacts in heaviest-as-lead platoon under different control strategies.
∆v (m/s)
Vehicles Rajamani Choi Prec. Acc. PAH Uncoord.
2-1 - - 0.7 - -
3-2 - - 0.5 - -
4-3 - - 0.6 0.3 1.2
5-4 - - 0.5 - -
Table 4.13: Peak impact force in heaviest-as-lead platoon under different control strategies.
FC (N)
Vehicles Rajamani Choi Prec. Acc. PAH Uncoord.
2-1 - - 18765 - 0
3-2 - - 36208 - 0
4-3 - - 32820 2855 14612
5-4 - - 17425 - 0
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Table 4.14: Time to stop a heaviest-as-lead platoon under different control strategies.
Controller Stop Time (s)
Rajamani 4.41
Choi 4.41
Prec. Acc. 8.80
PAH 4.63
Uncoord. 4.41
4.5 Chapter Conclusions
The previously developed physical model of a vehicle is extended to a full platoon with
sensing, communication, regulation layer control, and collision dynamics models added.
Five different emergency control schemes are developed and compared in performance. The
performance is tested with a five vehicle platoon with vehicle masses pulled from a normal
distribution similar to the strict distribution discussed in Chapter 2. The tests are performed
under three different vehicle orderings, random, heaviest-in-rear, and heaviest-as-lead. The
results were compared with respect to the number of collisions, stopping time, vehicle
acceleration and jerk, and impact force. The Rajamani controller used for normal operating
conditions proved superior to the other five for emergency use.
The uncoordinated case performed interestingly well, never having collisions over ∆vsafe.
This controller is compelling because it removes the need for additional communication be-
yond the signal that an emergency scenario is occurring. While it was outperformed in all
cases by the more communication intensive controllers, it is encouraging that if commu-
nication fails even in emergencies there is still possibility to maintain a moderate level of
safety.
These results overall begin to show the gravity of these emergency scenarios, despite
the strictness of the braking distribution and the relatively low relative velocities, large
impact forces were generated. While no definite threshold of safety has been declared, the
damage such forces are capable of is no small matter.
On the other hand, the significant safety improvement of proper ordering in a platoon
is a welcome finding. This can come at almost no cost to system performance, simply if a
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vehicle checking in has greater mass than any other in the platoon it will check into the front
and become the new leader. Otherwise it will queue in the back. Other simple means might
show to have great improvements to safety as models are refined and other configurations
explored.
87
Chapter 5
Conclusions
Automated platooning is interesting because it offers large economic benefits if it can
be achieved. AET is a form of highway automation that uses EVs for platooning. Safety is
an important consideration for design decisions. In order to be successful the system must
be safer than traditional highways in addition to higher capacity. It is also a fundamentally
difficult problem, since inevitable delays and braking variations quickly cause emergency
brake scenarios to generate unsafe differences in velocity within the platoon. If said delays
and variations are not carefully controlled as much as possible, safe platooning is not possible
in the emergency brake scenario.
Using ∆v as a safety metric, platooning is justified through large improvements to
highway density without significant compromise in safety. To avoid safety compromise, the
vehicles must remain outside the UHZ, which is determined by vehicle and system design.
Factors considered in the analysis include delays and braking ability, with consistency in
ability showing to be more critical. Therefore, a homogeneous vehicle design is recom-
mended. Some delay and variation in braking ability between vehicles is inevitable and can
be tolerated as long as disparities are kept small.
To better understand how variation in braking ability can occur, a physical model of
an AET vehicle is developed. This model shows that variation in the maximum voltage
available to the motor and the vehicle mass are the greatest factors in braking ability. The
results on the effects of tire condition were deemed inconclusive.
The variations in braking discussed in Chapter 2 are applied through variations in
vehicle mass, subjecting a model of a five vehicles platoon to non-ideal emergency scenarios.
Several longitudinal controllers are tested under the emergency brake scenario, the most
effective proving that developed by Rajamani et al. [44]. These tests also show that better
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safety is achieved when preceding vehicle and leader information is communicated and
used. Another result is the importance of ordering vehicles in the platoon such that the
most massive vehicle is the leader. While safety can be maintained through any ordering,
safety is greatly improved through proper assignment of the most massive vehicle as the
platoon leader. Therefore even if the distribution of braking is strict, appropriate measures
must be applied to ensure that the platoon is well organized and controlled to maintain
safety. Many such seemingly cursory system-level design decisions will have similarly large
impacts on safety and performance.
Two main models result from this work which were implemented as Simulink models
that can be run by Matlab script, the first order brake model, and the full platoon model.
The former is more abstracted for system design, the latter more detailed for vehicle design.
These models can be used for a variety of analyses that are beyond the scope of this work.
For future work that other investigators might pursue: the causes and probability
of emergency brake scenarios occurring on an AET highway should be investigated. The
results will provide a more clear context for the conclusions drawn here and indicate what
threshold of probability of unsafe collision is acceptable for determining the safe headways.
The effects of tire condition on braking ability needs more research and better representation
in the model. More accurate models for communication and sensing may have important
effects on these results as the controllers depend on the information received through these
channels. Similarly, a better representation of the emergency control strategy suggested
by Choi and Darbha [47] deserves a true implementation for comparison to the Rajamani
controller. The simulations in Chapter 4 are limited to a very few cases. The effects of larger
platoon size, larger communication delays, noise in the sensing, etc., are not addressed and
may prove interesting at the least. A very important factor that could not be investigated
more deeply in this work is the parameter distributions that would be appropriate for the
model. Real world measurements and identification of the braking variance that occurs in
an actual collection of homogeneous vehicles would help immensely to validate this work.
Altogether, safe platooning is an extremely challenging task. While many of these
89
results are discouraging, they do not prohibit safe platooning. They do indicate that a
simplistic model is unlikely to yield a successful system, as most likely merging and splitting
in a platoon will be constrained and vehicles will require very strict regulation. However,
advances toward highway automation technology are likely to apply to current highways
and vehicles with benefits of safety and efficiency for drivers and economies.
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Appendix A
Simulink Model of First Order Brake System and Associated
Scripts
The Matlab scripts and Simulink models are included here so that subsequent investi-
gators of AET are able to use for further research the models and methods of safety analysis
developed in this work. The listings are complete and include all code written by the author
for generating the plots found in Chapter 2. Understanding of these items may be useful
for comprehension of the analysis in this document but is certainly not necessary.
A.1 Simulink Model
A screen-shot of the main model is displayed in Figure A.1, with screen-shots of the
leader and follower subsystems in Figures A.2 and A.3, respectively.
Comparison of the leader and follower blocks shows that they are nearly identical,
only differing in the leader having a source for the brake signal while the follower receives
that signal through an input port. This allows for the addition of copies of the follower
block if more than two vehicles are desired. For all the analysis in this document, two
proved sufficient. These subsystems are a simple, first-order system with two additional
integrations to find position. All the additional complexity is for switching between inputs
when the vehicle has reached a complete stop (to prevent rolling backwards).
All the blocks have workspace variables for parameter values such that it can be entirely
configured and run from the Matlab command line via script. The variables to be configured
are shown in Table A.1.
The outputs of the simulation are the workspace structures DeltaV and Headway. Usage
examples are found in the script in Section A.3.
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Fig. A.1: Simulink model.
98
Fig. A.2: Leader subsystem.
99
Fig. A.3: Follower subsystem.
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A.2 Matlab Functions for Analyzing Data From the Model
The following functions are useful in interpreting the parametrically defined H-∆v
curve found returned from the Simulink model. Usage is exemplified in these scripts used
to generate the plots found in Chapter 2.
success.m
This function’s task is to return the unit rect function corresponding to the unsafe
headway zone. The return value is divided into headway bins of 0.1m, each containing a
one if the safe ∆v threshold is surpassed at that headway, zero otherwise.
1 %Spencer Jackson
2 function s = suc c e s s ( thresho ld , dV, H)
3 s = zeros (1 ,801) ;%cover from H=[0 ,80] meters
4 a=0;
5 b=0;
6 for i = 1 : length (H)
7 i f (dV( i )>=thre sho ld )
8 i f ( a )
9 b=H( i ) ;
10 else
11 a=H( i ) ;
12 b=a ;
13 end
Table A.1: Inputs for first order brake system Simulink model.
Workspace Variable Units Description
V0l m/s Leader initial velocity
V0f m/s Follower initial velocity
aminl m/s2 Leader minimum acceleration
aminf m/s2 Follower minimum acceleration
taul s Leader time constant
tauf s Follower time constant
actDell s Leader actuatin delay
actDelf s Follower actuation delay
comDel s Communication delay
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14 end
15 end
16
17 a = ce i l ( a ∗10)+1;%round to neare s t .1m
18 b = ce i l (b∗10)+1;%+1 fo r index
19 i f ˜( a==1&&b==1)
20 for i=a : b
21 s (1 , i )=1;
22 end
23 end
24 s = s ( 1 , 1 : 8 01 ) ;
25 end
boundedrandn.m
This function uses excised generation to pull outcomes from a bounded random normal
distribution.
1 function x = boundedrandn (L , mu, sigma , lower , upper )
2 x = sigma∗randn (1 ,L) + mu;
3 while (min( x )<lower ) | | (max( x )>upper )
4 indx = find (x<lower ) ;
5 L = length ( indx ) ;
6 x ( indx ) = sigma∗randn (1 ,L) + mu;
7 indx = find (x>upper ) ;
8 L = length ( indx ) ;
9 x ( indx ) = sigma∗randn (1 ,L) + mu;
10 end
A.3 Matlab Script for H-∆v Plots, HDV Plots, and Monte Carlo Plots in
Chapter 2
Note that this script uses several functions, most of which are defined above in Section
A.2. The exception is the crossing function as first referenced in line 92. This copywritten
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function is available on the Matlab Central File Exchange at http://www.mathworks.com/
matlabcentral/fileexchange/2432.
1 %Spencer Jackson
2 %This genera t e s a l l the p l o t s f o r the ITS paper
3 hdvcurves = 1 ;
4 uhzcurves = 1 ;
5 montecarlo = 1 ;
6 d i s t h i s t = 1 ;
7
8 t1=clock ;
9
10
11 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
12 % HdV p l o t s
13 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
14 i f ( hdvcurves )
15 V0l = 30 ;%m/s
16 V0f = 30 ;%m/s
17 aminl = −10;%m/sˆ2
18 aminf = −8;%m/sˆ2
19 tau l =.1 ;%s
20 tau f = . 1 ;%s
21 ac tDe l l = . 1 ;%s
22 ac tDe l f = . 1 ;%s
23 comDel = . 0 6 0 ;%s
24
25 sim ( ’ f i r s tOrde rBrake . mdl ’ )
26 H = Headway . s i g n a l s . va lue s ;
27 dv = max(0 , deltaV . s i g n a l s . va lue s ) ;
28 data = [H dv ] ;
29 save hdvcurvesICV . tab data −a s c i i
30
31 V0l = 30 ;%m/s
32 V0f = 30 ;%m/s
33 aminl = −10;%m/sˆ2
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34 aminf = −8;%m/sˆ2
35 tau l =.01;%s
36 tau f = . 0 1 ;%s
37 ac tDe l l = 0 ;%s
38 ac tDe l f = 0 ;%s
39 comDel = 0 ;%s
40 sim ( ’ f i r s tOrde rBrake . mdl ’ )
41 H = Headway . s i g n a l s . va lue s ;
42 dv = max(0 , deltaV . s i g n a l s . va lue s ) ;
43 data = [H dv ] ;
44 save hdvcurvesEV . tab data −a s c i i
45 %f p r i n t f ( hdvcurve , ’% f %f ’ , H1, dv1 ) ;
46
47 %p l o t (H1, dv1 ,H2, dv2 , ’−− ’) ;
48 %t i t l e ( ’H− \Del ta v ’ ) ;
49 %legend ( ’ICV’ , ’EV’ ) ;
50 %x l a b e l ( ’ I n i t i a l Headway (m) ’) ;
51 %y l a b e l ( ’ \Del ta Ve l o c i t y (m/s ) ’ ) ;
52 %mat l a b2 t i k z ( ’ hdvcurve . t i k z ’ ) ;
53 %disp ( ’ done ’ )
54 %pause
55 c l f
56 V0l = 30 ;%m/s
57 V0f = 30 ;%m/s
58 aminl = −10;%m/sˆ2
59 aminf = −9.5;%m/sˆ2
60 tau l =.01;%s
61 tau f = . 1 ;%s
62 ac tDe l l = 0 ;%s
63 ac tDe l f = 0 ;%s
64 comDel = . 2 ;%s
65 for aminf=[−9.5 −10 −10.5]
66 sim ( ’ f i r s tOrde rBrake . mdl ’ )
67 H = Headway . s i g n a l s . va lue s ;
68 dv = max(0 , deltaV . s i g n a l s . va lue s ) ;
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69 data = [H dv ] ;
70 hold on
71 plot (H, dv ) ;
72 s t r = [ ’ hdvcurves ’ num2str(−aminf ) ’ . tab ’ ] ;
73 save ( s t r , ’ data ’ , ’−a s c i i ’ ) ;
74 end
75 hold o f f
76 end%sk i p
77
78
79 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
80 % UHZ p l o t s
81 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
82 i f ( uhzcurves )
83 param = −10: .01:−7;
84 l = length ( param) ;
85 V0l = 30 ;%m/s
86 V0f = 30 ;%m/s
87 aminl = −10;%m/sˆ2
88 aminf = −8;%m/sˆ2
89 tau l =.01;%s
90 tau f = . 0 1 ;%s
91 ac tDe l l = 0 ;%s
92 ac tDe l f = 0 ;%s
93 comDel = . 0 2 ;%s
94 va l s = [ . 0 1 .02 . 1 ] ;
95 z = zeros (6 , l ) ;
96 for j =1:3
97 tau f = va l s ( j ) ;
98 for i = 1 : l
99 aminf = param( i ) ;
100 sim ( ’ f i r s tOrde rBrake . mdl ’ )
101 [ int , tmp ] = c r o s s i n g ( deltaV . s i g n a l s . va lues , Headway .
s i g n a l s . va lues , 2 . 5 ) ;
102 i f (tmp)
105
103 z (2∗ j −1:2∗ j , i ) = tmp ;
104 end
105 end
106 end
107 tau f = . 0 1 ;
108 plot (param , z )
109 data = [ param ’ z ’ ] ;
110 save unsafeHeadwayTau . tab data −a s c i i
111
112 va l s = [ . 0 2 .04 . 2 ] ;
113 z = zeros (6 , l ) ;
114 for j =1:3
115 comDel = va l s ( j ) ;
116 for i = 1 : l
117 aminf = param( i ) ;
118 sim ( ’ f i r s tOrde rBrake . mdl ’ )
119 [ int , tmp ] = c r o s s i n g ( deltaV . s i g n a l s . va lues , Headway .
s i g n a l s . va lues , 2 . 5 ) ;
120 i f (tmp)
121 z (2∗ j −1:2∗ j , i ) = tmp ;
122 end
123 end
124 end
125 comDel = . 0 2 ;
126 plot (param , z )
127 data = [ param ’ z ’ ] ;
128 save unsafeHeadwayCom . tab data −a s c i i
129
130 va l s = [ . 0 2 .04 . 2 ] ;
131 va l s2 = [ . 0 1 .02 . 1 ] ;
132 z = zeros (6 , l ) ;
133 for j =1:3
134 comDel = va l s ( j ) ;
135 tau f = va l s2 ( j ) ;
136 for i = 1 : l
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137 aminf = param( i ) ;
138 sim ( ’ f i r s tOrde rBrake . mdl ’ )
139 [ int , tmp ] = c r o s s i n g ( deltaV . s i g n a l s . va lues , Headway .
s i g n a l s . va lues , 2 . 5 ) ;
140 i f (tmp)
141 z (2∗ j −1:2∗ j , i ) = tmp ;
142 end
143 end
144 end
145 comDel = . 0 2 ;
146 tau f = . 0 1 ;
147 plot (param , z )
148 data = [ param ’ z ’ ] ;
149 save unsafeHeadwayBoth . tab data −a s c i i
150 end%sk i p
151
152 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
153 % Monte Carlo
154 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
155 i f ( montecarlo )
156 nmc = 30 ;%number o f monte ca r l o s imu la t i on s
157 n = 1000 ;%number o f runs/mc
158 dV = [0 2 .5 5 ] ;%m/s
159
160 V0l = 30 ;%m/s
161 V0f = 30 ;%m/s
162 tau l = . 0 1 ;%s
163 tau f = . 0 1 ;%s
164 ac tDe l l = 0 ;%s
165 ac tDe l f = 0 ;%s
166 comDel = . 0 2 ;%s
167
168 %taus = [ . 0 1 . 1 ] ;
169 de l s = . 0 2 : . 0 2 : . 2 ;
170 amindev = [ . 2 . 7 5 ] ;%std de v i a t i on
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171 aminmean = [−9.75 −7 .75 ] ;
172 aminboundu = aminmean+[1 3 ] . ∗ amindev ;%upper bound
173 aminboundl = aminmean−[1 3 ] . ∗ amindev ;%lower bound
174 m = length ( d e l s ) ;
175 l = length ( amindev ) ;
176 ldv = length (dV) ;
177 %d i s t r i b u t i o n = zeros ( l d v ∗ l , 801) ;
178 everyth ing = zeros (m, l , ldv , nmc , 801 ) ;
179 for h = 1 : l %d i s t r i b u t i o n s
180 for i =1:nmc %monte ca r l o sims
181 aminlarray = boundedrandn (n , aminmean(h) , amindev (h) , aminboundl (
h) , aminboundu (h) ) ;
182 aminfarray = boundedrandn (n , aminmean(h) , amindev (h) , aminboundl (
h) , aminboundu (h) ) ;
183 for j = 1 :m %de l ay s
184 %tau f = taus ( j ) ;
185 comDel = de l s ( j ) ;
186 d i s t r i b u t i o n = zeros ( ldv , 801 ) ;
187 for k = 1 : n %runs
188 aminl = aminlarray (k ) ;
189 aminf = aminfarray (k ) ;
190 sim ( ’ f i r s tOrde rBrakenode l . mdl ’ ) ;
191 %s = succe s s (dV(2) , de l taV . s i g n a l s . va lues , Headway . s i g n a l s .
v a l u e s ) ;
192 s1 = suc c e s s (dV(1) , deltaV . s i g n a l s . va lues , Headway . s i g n a l s .
va lue s ) ;
193 s2 = suc c e s s (dV(2) , deltaV . s i g n a l s . va lues , Headway . s i g n a l s .
va lue s ) ;
194 s3 = suc c e s s (dV(3) , deltaV . s i g n a l s . va lues , Headway . s i g n a l s .
va lue s ) ;
195
196 %d i s t r i b u t i o n ( j , : ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n ( j , : )+s/n ;
197 d i s t r i b u t i o n ( 1 , : ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n ( 1 , : )+s1 /n ;
198 d i s t r i b u t i o n ( 2 , : ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n ( 2 , : )+s2 /n ;
199 d i s t r i b u t i o n ( 3 , : ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n ( 3 , : )+s3 /n ;
108
200
201 end %runs
202 everyth ing ( j , h , : , i , : ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n ;
203 end %de l ay s
204 end %monte c a r l o s
205 %p l o t ( 0 : . 1 : 8 0 , d i s t r i b u t i o n )
206 end %d i s t r i b u t i o n s
207
208 data = 0 : . 1 : 8 0 ;
209 for i =1: ldv %dv
210 for h=1: l %d i s t
211 for j =1:m %de l
212 mat = squeeze ( everyth ing ( j , h , i , : , : ) ) ;
213 data = [ data ;mean(mat) ; var (mat) ] ;
214 end
215 end
216 end
217 data = data ’ ;
218 save newmontecarlodel . tab data −a s c i i
219
220 V0l = 30 ;%m/s
221 V0f = 30 ;%m/s
222 tau l = . 0 1 ;%s
223 tau f = . 0 1 ;%s
224 ac tDe l l = 0 ;%s
225 ac tDe l f = 0 ;%s
226 comDel = . 0 2 ;%s
227
228 %taus = [ . 0 1 . 1 ] ;
229 de l s = [ . 0 2 . 2 ] ;
230 amindev = . 2 : . 0 5 5 : . 7 5 ;%std de v i a t i on
231 aminmean = −9 .75 : . 2 : −7 .75 ;
232 aminboundu = aminmean+(1 : . 2 : 3 ) .∗ amindev ;%upper bound
233 aminboundl = aminmean− ( 1 : . 2 : 3 ) .∗ amindev ;%lower bound
234 m = length ( d e l s ) ;
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235 l = length ( amindev ) ;
236 ldv = length (dV) ;
237 %d i s t r i b u t i o n = zeros ( l d v ∗ l , 801) ;
238 everyth ing = zeros (m, l , ldv , nmc , 801 ) ;
239 for h = 1 : l %d i s t r i b u t i o n s
240 for i =1:nmc %monte ca r l o sims
241 aminlarray = boundedrandn (n , aminmean(h) , amindev (h) , aminboundl (
h) , aminboundu (h) ) ;
242 aminfarray = boundedrandn (n , aminmean(h) , amindev (h) , aminboundl (
h) , aminboundu (h) ) ;
243 for j = 1 :m %de l ay s
244 %tau f = taus ( j ) ;
245 comDel = de l s ( j ) ;
246 d i s t r i b u t i o n = zeros ( ldv , 801 ) ;
247 for k = 1 : n %runs
248 aminl = aminlarray (k ) ;
249 aminf = aminfarray (k ) ;
250 sim ( ’ f i r s tOrde rBrakenode l . mdl ’ ) ;
251 %s = succe s s (dV(2) , de l taV . s i g n a l s . va lues , Headway . s i g n a l s .
v a l u e s ) ;
252 s1 = suc c e s s (dV(1) , deltaV . s i g n a l s . va lues , Headway . s i g n a l s .
va lue s ) ;
253 s2 = suc c e s s (dV(2) , deltaV . s i g n a l s . va lues , Headway . s i g n a l s .
va lue s ) ;
254 s3 = suc c e s s (dV(3) , deltaV . s i g n a l s . va lues , Headway . s i g n a l s .
va lue s ) ;
255
256 %d i s t r i b u t i o n ( j , : ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n ( j , : )+s/n ;
257 d i s t r i b u t i o n ( 1 , : ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n ( 1 , : )+s1 /n ;
258 d i s t r i b u t i o n ( 2 , : ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n ( 2 , : )+s2 /n ;
259 d i s t r i b u t i o n ( 3 , : ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n ( 3 , : )+s3 /n ;
260
261 end %runs
262 everyth ing ( j , h , : , i , : ) = d i s t r i b u t i o n ;
263 end %de l ay s
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264 end %monte c a r l o s
265 %p l o t ( 0 : . 1 : 8 0 , d i s t r i b u t i o n )
266 end %d i s t r i b u t i o n s
267
268 data = 0 : . 1 : 8 0 ;
269 for i =1: ldv %dv
270 for h=1: l %d i s t
271 for j =1:m %de l
272 mat = squeeze ( everyth ing ( j , h , i , : , : ) ) ;
273 data = [ data ;mean(mat) ; var (mat) ] ;
274 end
275 end
276 end
277 data = data ’ ;
278 save newmontecar lodist . tab data −a s c i i
279 end%sk i p
280
281 i f ( d i s t h i s t )
282 a = boundedrandn (n ,−10 ,.25 ,− i n f ,−9.5) ;
283 b = boundedrandn (n,−10 ,1 ,− i n f ,−7) ;
284 r = ce i l (10∗ (max( a )−min( a ) ) ) ;
285 [ y , x ] = hist ( a , r ) ;
286 data = [ x ’ y ’ ] ;
287 save d i s t r i b u t i o n 1 . tab data −a s c i i
288 r = ce i l (10∗ (max(b)−min(b) ) ) ;
289 [ y , x ] = hist (b , r ) ;
290 data = [ x ’ y ’ ] ;
291 save d i s t r i b u t i o n 2 . tab data −a s c i i
292 end%sk i p
293
294 clock−t1
295 clock
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Appendix B
Simulink Model of Full Platoon and Associated Scripts
The Matlab scripts and Simulink models are included here so that subsequent inves-
tigators of AET are able to use the models and methods of safety analysis developed here
for further research. The listings are complete and include all code written by the author
for generating the plots found in Chapter 4. Understanding of these items may be useful
for comprehension of the analysis in this document but is certainly not necessary.
B.1 Simulink Model
Screen-shots of the model are found in Figures B.1 through B.6. The key to usage of
this Simulink model is understanding that nearly every signal is or can be a vector with
each element corresponding to a vehicle in the platoon. The first element of the vector is
the leader, the second index the second vehicle, etc. This way the number of vehicles is
easily configurable through Matlab scripts.
While this model has been used here almost exclusively for analysis of the emergency
brake scenario, there is no inherent limitation to this application. This model can serve well
for analyses of steady-state or less extreme emergency operations as well.
Screen-shots of Simulink Model
In the screen-shots several embedded Matlab functon blocks can be observed. The code
contained in these blocks is listed in the sections that follow.
VehiclePlotter
This block is for the sole purpose of visualization. Its output is used by the script in
Section B.2 to make plots that can be made into a movie by cycling through the plots like
a slide show with each plot shown for 0.07s.
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Fig. B.1: Full platoon model.
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Fig. B.2: Controller subsystem.
Fig. B.3: Vehicle subsystem.
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Fig. B.4: Vehicle motor subsubsystem.
Fig. B.5: Vehicle communication subsystem.
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Fig. B.6: Vehicle sensors subsystem.
1 function [ x , y ] = fcn ( pos , V)
2 %#eml
3 l = V. l /2 ;
4 w = V.w/2 ;
5 x = [ pos+l pos+l pos−l pos−l pos+l ] ;
6 y = [w −w −w w w ] ;
Range
This sensor merely takes the vehicle positions and calculates the headway such as a
laser range finder or ultrasonic sensor might report. Note the commented out code to add
some noise to the measurement if desired.
1 function range = fcn (Pos , V)
2 %#eml
3
4 %sigma = .5;% s t . dev .
5 H = −d i f f ( Pos )−V. l ;
6 %f i r s t car has no reading
7 range = [ i n f ; H ] ;% + sigma∗randn ( l en g t h ( spac ing ) ,1) ] ;
116
Regulation Layer
One of the more complicated function blocks, this takes the communicated, sensed, and
predetermined data and calculates the desired acceleration for each vehicle. A switch-case
function is used to determine which controller is employed during emergencies. Also in this
function (at the end) the manner of emergency signal propagation is determined, with the
serial type propagation (see Section 4.1.1 for description) commented out.
1 function [ ades ,EB] = fcn ( Sensor ,Comm, Vdes , time , Des i red Spac ing ,
Emergency accel , teb , Emergency in i t i a to r , c t l )
2 %#eml
3
4 n = length ( Sensor ) /3 ;%Number of Vehic les ;
5 H = Sensor ( 1 : n) ;
6 ve l = Sensor ( ( n+1) :2∗n) ;
7 a c c e l = Sensor ( (2∗n+1) : end) ;
8 p r e cv e l = Comm( 1 : ( n−1) ) ;%preced ing v e h i c l e v e l o c i t y
9 precacc = Comm(( n+1) : ( 2∗n−1) ) ;%preced ing v e h i c l e a c c e l e r a t i o n
10 %EB = Comm((2∗n+1) : end ) ;%emergency s i g n a l see be low
11 l v e l = Comm(1) ;%leade r v e l o c i t y
12 l a c c = Comm(n+1) ;%leade r a c c e l e r a t i o n
13 e r r = H−Des i red Spac ing ;
14 e r rdo t = vel −[Vdes ; p r e cve l ] ;
15
16 %Rajamani ’ s Con t r o l l e r
17 C1 = . 5 ;%importance o f l e ade r i n f o
18 zeta = 1 ;%dampint (1= c r i t i c a l )
19 wn = 5 ;%con t r o l l e r BW ( smal l f o r comfort ) ( j e rk<5m/s ˆ3)
20 l ade s = −( ze ta+sqrt ( ze ta ˆ2−1) ) ∗wn∗( v e l (1 )−Vdes ) ;
21 ad1 = (1−C1) .∗ precacc + C1∗ l a c c . . .
22 −(2∗ zeta−C1∗( ze ta+sqrt ( ze ta ˆ2−1) ) ) ∗wnˆ2 .∗ e r rdo t ( 2 :end) . . .
23 −( ze ta+sqrt ( ze ta ˆ2−1) ) ∗wn∗C1 . ∗ ( v e l ( 2 :end)− l v e l ) + wnˆ2 .∗ e r r ( 2 :end) ;
24 ad = max(−2 ,min ( 2 , [ l ade s ; ad1 ] ) ) ;%l im i t f o r passenger comfort
25
26 %in emergency
27 e lad = Emergency accel ;%leade r acce l−>0 once s topped
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28 switch c t l
29 case 1 %%no change c o n t r o l l e r
30 ead = [ e lad ; ad1 ] ;
31 case 2 %%choi
32 C1 = 0 ;%importance o f l e ade r i n f o
33 zeta = 1 ;
34 wn = 5 ;
35 ead1 = (1−C1) .∗ precacc + C1∗ l a c c . . .
36 −(2∗ zeta−C1∗( ze ta+sqrt ( ze ta ˆ2−1) ) ) ∗wnˆ2 .∗ e r rdo t ( 2 :end) . . .
37 −( ze ta+sqrt ( ze ta ˆ2−1) ) ∗wn∗C1 . ∗ ( v e l ( 2 :end)− l v e l ) + wnˆ2 .∗ e r r ( 2 :end)
;
38 ead = min ( 0 , [ e l ad ; ead1 ] ) . ∗ ( ve l >0) ;
39 case 3%%preced ing ac c e l method
40 ead = [ e lad ; min(0 , precacc ) ] . ∗ ( ve l >0) ;%emergency de s i r ed a c c e l e r a t i o n
41 case 4%%mycon t ro l l e r (PAH)
42 ead1 = precacc +e r r ( 2 : n ) ;
43 ead = min ( 0 , [ e l ad ; ead1 ] ) . ∗ ( ve l >0) ;
44 case 5 %%stay on t a r g e t method ( uncoordinated )
45 ead = [ e lad ; e lad+e r r ( 2 : n ) ] . ∗ ( ve l >0) ;%emergency de s i r ed a c c e l e r a t i o n
46
47 otherw i s e
48 ead = − i n f ∗ ones (n , 1 ) ;
49 end
50
51 EB = Comm((2∗n+1) : end) ;%emergency s i g n a l
52 %EB = [EB(1) ; EB(1 : n−1) |EB(2 : n) ];%1 v e h i c l e a t a time s e r i a l propagat ion
53 EB = min(cumsum(EB) ,1 ) ;%a l l f o l l ow i n g v e h i c l e s a t the same time r e c e i v e s i g n a l
54 ades = EB.∗ ead + (˜EB) .∗ ad ;%EB v e h i c l e s use emergency c o n t r o l l e r
55 i f ( time>teb )
56 EB( Emergency in i t i a to r ) = 1 ;%i n i t i a t o r immediate ly b eg in s brak ing
57 ades ( Emergency in i t i a to r ) = e lad ;%i n i t i a t o r does not f o l l ow prec . v e h i c l e s
58 end
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Motor Coils
A simple first order system based on the RC equivalent model of motor coils with the
back electro-motive force.
1 function Tdot = fcn (v ,T,V)
2 %#eml
3 Tdot = (V.Kt∗v − V.Rm∗T)/V.Lm;
Vehicle Dynamics
This function implements all the modeling from Chapter 3.
1 function [ a , wdot , zdot ] = fcn (T m, F c , v , omega , z ,V)
2 %#eml
3
4 netFc = [ F c ’ 0 ] − [ 0 F c ’ ] ;%c o l l i s i o n f o r c e i s f o r c e on rear bumper , f r on t
bumper f o r c e= preced ing v e h i c l e rear
5 %r e l a t i v e v e l o c i t y
6 v r = V. h .∗ omega − v ;
7 %normal f o r c e
8 F n = 9.8∗V.M’ ;
9 %LuGre model
10 g = V. mu c+(V. mu st−V. mu c ) .∗exp(−sqrt (abs ( v r /V. v s ) ) ) ;
11 zdot = v r−V. theta .∗V. sigma0 .∗ abs ( v r ) . / g .∗ z ;
12 %long . dynamics
13 F tr = (V. sigma0 .∗ z +V. sigma1 .∗ zdot + V. sigma2 .∗ v r ) .∗ F n ;
14 F adrag = V. c adrag .∗ v . ˆ 2 ;
15 a = (4 .∗ F tr ’ −F adrag ’ + netFc ) . /V.M;
16 %rot . dynamics
17 wdot = (T m −V. h .∗ F tr −V.B.∗ omega ) . /V. J ;
Collision Detection
More than just detection, this block also calculates the force of collision between ve-
hicles. This is perhaps the most complicated block shown. This is largely due to the
requirement of knowing the time of initial impact. Thus persistent variables are used such
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that the time of collision (tci) is remembered between calls to the function. This function
also outputs the two vectors totalCollisions and collisions which should contain in-
formation about the number of impacts that occur between each vehicle and the number
of vehicles that had collisions over ∆vsafe. These outputs are not working correctly at the
time of this writing due to switching chatter.
1 function [ ncol , tnco l , Fc ] = fcn (Pos , Vel , V, time , dvsa fe )
2 %#eml
3 p e r s i s t e n t prevuCol prevCol t c i t o t a l C o l l i s i o n s c o l l i s i o n s ;
4 ldv = length ( dvsa fe ) ;
5 H = −d i f f ( Pos )−V. l ;
6 n = length (H) ;%number o f v e h i c l e s i n t e r a c t i o n s (#veh i c l e s −1)
7 dv = d i f f ( Vel ) ;
8 i f isempty ( prevuCol )%i n i t i a l i z a t i o n
9 prevuCol = zeros ( ldv , n) ;
10 prevCol = zeros (1 , n ) ;
11 t c i = zeros (1 , n ) ;
12 t o t a l C o l l i s i o n s = zeros ( ldv , n) ;
13 c o l l i s i o n s = zeros ( ldv , n) ;
14 end
15 co l = H<=0;%current c o l l i s i o n s
16 %r s t = doub le (˜ co l ) ;% r e s e t c o l l i s i o n time
17 t c i = t c i + ( time−t c i ) . ∗ ( co l ’−prevCol .∗ co l ’ ) ;%i n i t i a l c o l l i s i o n time
18 prevCol = double ( co l ’ ) ;
19 unsa fe = zeros ( ldv , length ( c o l ) ) ;%c o l l i s i o n s over dv sa f e t h r e s h o l d
20 for i = 1 : ldv
21 unsa fe ( i , : ) = (dv>dvsa fe ( i ) )&co l ;
22 end
23 t o t a l C o l l i s i o n s = t o t a l C o l l i s i o n s + unsafe−prevuCol .∗ unsa fe ;%t h i s shows how
many c o l l i s i o n s each v e h i c l e had
24 c o l l i s i o n s = min(1 , c o l l i s i o n s + unsa fe ) ;%t h i s on ly shows what v e h i c l e s had
unsafe c o l l s i o n s
25 prevuCol = unsa fe ;
26
27 tp = . 0 7 ;%s
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28 cd = 95800;%Ns/mˆ2
29 k = 73000;%N/m
30 tc = time − t c i ;
31 Fc1= cd .∗min(1 , tc ’ . / tp ) . ˆ 3 . ∗ dv.∗−H + k.∗−H;
32 Fc = Fc1 .∗ c o l ;%forc e from each c o l l i s i o n (non c o l l i s i o n s s e t to 0)
33 nco l = c o l l i s i o n s ;
34 tnco l = t o t a l C o l l i s i o n s ;
As has been mentioned in the main text, there is an infrastructure set up here such that
much more sophisticated models can be easily implemented, specifically with communication
and sensing.
All the blocks here can be configured through Matlab scripting. Comparison to Ap-
pendix A shows that this model is significantly more complicated with several times more
variables. The variables used for input are shown in Table B.1. The structure V helps to
organize the parameters that are representing vehicles directly instead of system or platoon
characteristics. These parameters can be set to vectors of the same length as the platoon
so that each vehicle has a unique value. These can also be set to scalars if homogeneity
is desired in the platoon. Examples of both types of assignment are found in the script in
Section B.3.
All the Matlab workspace variables in Table B.1 must be assigned for the Simulink
model to run properly, so it is recommended to always use a script such as found below.
There are several model outputs, nearly all in the form of workspace structure vari-
ables. The vehicle states of acceleration, velocity, and position are output to the struc-
ture VehicleStates. The collision force between each vehicle is found in the structure
collisonForce. These are the primary outputs used for the analysis. Another important
output is the VehiclePower structure which contains in Watts the power used by the motor.
The outputs collisions and totalCollisions are not currently functional.
B.2 Matlab Functions for Analyzing Data From the Full Platoon Model
The Matlab functions that follow are useful for analyzing and visualizing the outputs
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Table B.1: Inputs for full platoon Simulink model.
Workspace Variable Units Description
V.w m width
V.l l length
V.M kg mass
V.h m wheel effective radius
V.J Kgm2 wheel moment of inertia
V.B Kgm2/s rotational damping
V.c adrag - aerodynamic drag coefficient
V.Kemf Vs/rad motor back EMF constant
V.Kt Nm/a motor torque/amp constant
V.Rm Ω motor resistance
V.Lm H motor inducance
V.sat V battery maximum voltage
V.comDel s Communication delay
V.Kp - physical layer controller proportional gain
V.Ki - physical layer controller integral gain
V.Kd - physical layer controller derivative gain
V.theta - tire/road condition
V.mu c - Coulomb friction coefficient
V.mu st - static friction coefficient
V.sigma0 1/m spring factor
V.sigma1 s/m damping factor
V.sigma2 s/m viscus friction factor
V.v s m/s Stribeck velocity
V.v0 m/s initial velocity
V.x0 m initial position
Desired Velocity m/s platoon desired velocity
Desired Spacing m desired headway
teb s time emergency brake initiates
Emergency initiator - index of vehicle that begins emergency signal
Emergency accel m/s2 desired acceleration of platoon in emergency
dvsafe m/s acceptable ∆v of collision
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from the model. Some of the dependencies of these functions are already discussed in
Appendix A.
findDv.m
This function uses the impact force output of the model to find the time of impact,
with which the difference of vehicles’ velocities can be easily found. In the event of multiple
impacts the first is reported.
1 %Spencer Jackson
2 function Dv = findDv ( s ta t e s , f o r c e s )
3 [ r c ] = s ize ( f o r c e s ) ;
4 n=c ;
5 Dv = zeros (1 , n−1) ;
6 for i =1:n−1
7 indx = c r o s s i n g ( f o r c e s ( : , i +1) , f o r c e s ( : , 1 ) , . 0 0 1 ) ;
8 %for j =1: l e n g t h ( indx )
9 i f ( indx )
10 Dv( i ) = s t a t e s ( indx (1 ) ,n+2+i ) − s t a t e s ( indx (1 ) ,n+1+i ) ;
11 end
12 end
make500.m
This function is only useful if using the output data in LATEX plots created by the
pgfplots package. Very large data sets are easily generated by this model, and the full
resolution plots showed tendencies to exceed the limited memory of TEX. A resolution of
about 500 points proved perfectly appropriate for this document, so the outputs were down
sampled to approximately this size.
1 %Spencer Jackson
2 %t h i s f unc t i on tak e s a t a b l e and makes i t more manageable (500 i s h po in t s ) f o r
p g f p l o t s
3 function smal ldata = make500 ( data )
4 [ r c ] = s ize ( data ) ;
5 i f ( r>600)
123
6 step = f loor ( r /500) ;
7 smal ldata = data ( 1 : s tep : end , : ) ;
8 else
9 smal ldata = data ;
10 end
makevid.m
This visualization function can be run after the model to both display a video in the
Matlab figure and save each plot created so that they can be made into other format videos
using simple video editors available for free on the Internet. The images are numbered and
need only be imported in order and set so that each displays for one fifteenth of a second
(about 0.07s). It is recommended that a separate directory be used to contain all the files
generated as they can number in the hundreds for even short videos.
1 %Spencer Jackson
2 %Aug 2012
3 %t h i s f unc t i on only works a f t e r running p la toon . mdl
4 function makevid ( dir )
5 mkdir ( dir ) ;
6 Vstr = [ ’V = ’ ] ;
7 VX = eva l i n ( ’ base ’ , ’ Vehic le X ’ ) ;
8 VY = eva l i n ( ’ base ’ , ’ Vehic le Y ’ ) ;
9 VV = eva l i n ( ’ base ’ , ’ Vehic le V ’ ) ;
10 V = eva l i n ( ’ base ’ , ’V ’ ) ;
11 n = s ize (VX. s i g n a l s . va lues , 1 )
12 for i =1:n−1
13 Vstr = [ Vstr ; ’V = ’ ] ;
14 end
15 f igure (1 ) ;
16 c l f ;
17 handle = plot ( [ 0 0] , [−1 2 ] ) ;
18 texthand le = text (1 , 1 , ’ . ’ ) ;
19 for t = 1 : s ize (VX. s i g n a l s . va lues , 3 )
20 delete ( handle ) ;
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21 delete ( texthand le ) ;
22 handle = plot (VX. s i g n a l s . va lue s ( : , : , t ) ’ ,VY. s i g n a l s . va lue s ( : , : , t ) ’ ) ;
23 axis equal ;
24 texthand le = text (VX. s i g n a l s . va lue s (1 , 3 , t ) ,V.w , [ ’V = ’ num2str(VV. s i g n a l s .
va lue s (1 , 1 , t ) ’ , 2 ) ] ) ;
25 print ( ’−dpng ’ , [ dir ’ / ’ num2str( t ) ’ . png ’ ] ) ;
26 %pause ( . 0 6 ) ;%uncomment f o r in f i g u r e movie
27 end
28 end
B.3 Matlab Script for Setting Up and Running the Full Platoon Model with
Emergency Brake Scenario, and Analyzing the Results
This script runs the Simulink model and generates the data for plots such as shown in
Chapter 4. The model is run once for each of the five controllers.
1 %Spencer Jackson
2 %July 2012
3
4 %con t r o l l e r s
5 n c t l =5;
6 ctlname = c e l l ( nct l , 1 ) ;
7 ctlname {1} = ’ none ’ ;
8 ctlname {2} = ’ cho i ’ ;
9 ctlname {3} = ’ precacc ’ ;
10 ctlname {4} = ’mine ’ ;
11 ctlname {5} = ’ sot ’ ;
12
13 %Vehic l e / p la toon c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
14 Number of Vehic les = 5 ;
15 V.w = 2 ;%m width
16 V. l = 5 ;%m leng t h
17 V.M = 1707+80∗randn (1 , Number of Vehic les ) ;%kg mass
18 V. h = . 3 2 3 ;%m wheel e f f e c t i v e rad ius
19 V. J = 2 . 6 0 3 ; %ro t a t i o n a l i n e r t i a ( wheel + motor )
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20 V.B = 1 . 2257 ; %ro t a t i o n a l damping
21 V. c adrag = . 3 6 9 3 ; %aerodynamic drag c o e f f
22 V.Kemf = . 4 7 ;%vs /rad Motor back emf gain
23 V.Kt = . 4 9 ;%nm/a motor torque /amp gain
24 V.Rm = . 1 ;%ohm motor r e s i s t a n c e
25 V.Lm = .000022 ;%h armature inductance
26 V. sa t = 250 ; %v sa tu ra t i on ( b a t t e r y max V)
27 V. comDel = . 0 2 ;%s communication de lay
28
29 %phy s i c a l l a y e r p id c o n t r o l l e r ga ins
30 V.Kp = 1000 ; %vc on t r o l l e r
31 V. Ki = 10 ; %vc on t r o l l e r
32 V.Kd = 0 ; %vc on t r o l l e r
33
34 %t i r e and road c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
35 V. theta = 1 ; %road cond i t i on
36 V. mu c = . 3 5 ; %Coulomb f r i c t i o n c o e f f
37 V. mu st = . 5 ; %s t a t i c f r i c t i o n c o e f f
38 V. sigma0 = 100 ; %spr ing f a c t o r
39 V. sigma1 = . 7 ; %damping f a c t o r
40 V. sigma2 = . 0 1 1 ; %vi s cou s f r i c . f a c t o r
41 V. v s = 10 ; %St r i b e c k v e l o c i t y
42
43 %se t po in t s
44 Des i r ed Ve l o c i t y = 30 ;%m/s
45 Des i red Spac ing = 1 ;%m, bumper to bumper d i s t .
46 teb = 1 ;%s time o f emergency brake s t a r t
47 Emergency in i t i a to r = 1 ;%ve h i c l e # in p la toon t ha t s t a r t s EBS
48 Emergency accel = −10;%m/sˆ2 de s i r ed a c c e l e r a t i o n in EBS
49 dvsa fe = [ 0 2 .5 5 ] ;%m/s a l l owa b l e d e l t a V in c o l l i s i o n
50
51 %i n i t i a l c ond i t i on s : ( l ead v e h i c l e i s index 1) ;
52 V. v0 = 30∗ ones (1 , Number of Vehic les ) ;%m/s
53 %you probab l y don ’ t need to change anyth ing be low t h i s po in t
54 i f ( length (V. l )==1)
126
55 step = (V. l +1) ;%1 i s i n i t i a l headway
56 V. x0 = step ∗Number of Vehic les :− s tep : s tep ;
57 else
58 V. x0 = ( Number of Vehic les :−1:1) + f l i p l r (cumsum( f l i p l r (V. l ) ) ) ;
59 end
60
61 %eve ry t h in g a f t e r t h i s i s s imu la t i on s t u f f
62 Dv = zeros ( nct l , Number of Vehic les −1) ;%c l o s i n g speed o f i n i t i a l impacts
63 t s top = zeros (1 , n c t l ) ;%time to s top
64 for ( c t l =1: n c t l ) %c t l s e l e c t s the c o n t r o l l e r (1 rajamani , recommended )
65 sim ( ’ p latoon . mdl ’ ) ;
66 data = [ Veh i c l eS ta t e s . time squeeze ( Veh i c l eS ta t e s . s i g n a l s (1 ) . va lue s
( 1 , : , : ) ) ’ squeeze ( Veh i c l eS ta t e s . s i g n a l s (2 ) . va lue s ( 1 , : , : ) ) ’ squeeze
( Veh i c l eS ta t e s . s i g n a l s (3 ) . va lue s ( 1 , : , : ) ) ’ ] ;
67 data2 = [ c o l l i s i o nF o r c e . time c o l l i s i o nF o r c e . s i g n a l s . va lue s ] ;
68 Dv( c t l , : ) = findDv ( data , data2 ) ;
69 t s top ( c t l ) = max( c o l l i s i o nF o r c e . time ) ;
70 d = make500 ( data ) ;
71 d2 = make500 ( data2 ) ;
72 s = [ ’ Vstates ’ ctlname{ c t l } ’ 3 . tab ’ ] ;
73 save ( s , ’ d ’ , ’−a s c i i ’ ) ;
74 s = [ ’ c f ’ ctlname{ c t l } ’ 3 . tab ’ ] ;
75 save ( s , ’ d2 ’ , ’−a s c i i ’ ) ;
76 end%sk i p sim
77 Dv = Dv
78 t s top = ts top
